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INTRODUCTION

F ALL THE CONFLICTS on the face of this small planet

[having a possibility of escalation into global warfare], the
region that has the greatest potential of leading the world's major
powers into direct (and possibly nuclear) confrontation is the Middle East. Since World War II, a sea of blood has washed the
sands of Sinai, Golan, Gaza and the West Bank in a continuing

conflict which is ostensibly religious, unquestionably territorial and
arguably ad infinitum.

The inability of both Jews and Arabs to

peacefully determine the future of Palestine has led to a deepening sense of insecurity in the entire world community -

fears

which become more acute as the conflict draws the Great Powers
toward a direct confrontation.'
In recent years, restraint on the
'Murphy, The Middle East Crisis, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 390 (1970). See
Neuman, The Arab-Israeli Dispute: Legal Issues and Possible Solutions, 4 INT'L
LAW. 360 (1970); Wright, The Middle East Problem, 4 INT'L LAW. 364 (1970);
Dinstein, The Arab-Israeli Crisis: Legal Issues and Possible Solutions, 4 INT'L LAW.
374 (1970); Bassiouni, The Middle East In Transition: From War to War, A Pro-
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part of industrialized nations entered the arena of economics as
Arab nations directly confronted the West with devastating embargoes on the export of petroleum and incredible increases in the
price of oil. The aggressive manipulation of the region's primary
natural resource, petroleum, has had such a significantly detrimental economic effect upon the world's industrialized nations as
to raise the possibility of military intervention.
October of 1973 brought war again to the Middle East, with
an Arab military assault upon Israeli forces on Yom Kippur.
That same month, the economic stability of the world's industrialized nations (which had theretofore grossly underestimated the
vast economic significance of the Arab oil weapon) was severely
threatened when Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) utilized oil as a political weapon,
and embargoed exports of petroleum for five long months. Another substantial economic blow was struck by OPEC with massive increases in the price of oil, from $2.10 per barrel on October 1,
1973, to well over $10.00 per barrel today.
This note shall attempt to provide an analysis of the international legal implications of the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74,
and the entire range of retaliatory responses which the United
States might conceivably employ should a future embargo of petroleum be initiated. The first portion of this note will endeavor
to analyze the question of whether the Arab oil embargo was a
legal employment of economic force.2 The latter portion of this
posed Solution, 4 INT'L LAW. 379 (1970); Bassiouni & Fisher, The Arab-Israeli Conflict - Real and Apparent Issues: An Insight into its Future From the Lessons of the
Past, 44 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 399 (1970); Dinstein, The Legal Issues of "Para-War"
and Peace in the Middle East, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 466 (1970).
2 See Paust & Blaustein, The Arab Oil Weapon - A Threat to International
Peace, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 410 (1974), who argue, "The Arab strategy constitutes
the deliberate employment of an economic instrument of coercion (the oil
"weapon") against other States and peoples in order to place intense pressure
upon their freedom of choice. Although this strategy is primarily dependent
upon the use of an economic instrument of coercion, the full dimension of the
coercive process has involved the interrelated use of diplomatic and ideological
instruments as well as the coordinate use of military forces against the State of
Israel. As such, the Arab oil embargo is in violation of international law, as
formulated in the United Nations Charter and key supporting documents."
Id. at 412. "-The United Nations, for example, could declare that there has
been a violation of those provisions dealing with the use of coercion, the promotion of friendly relations, the promotion of self-determination, the promotion
of equal rights of nations large and small, the promotion of social progress and
better standards of life in larger freedom, the peaceful settlement of disputes,
and the maintenance of international peace and security. In certain situations,
the use of any economic coercion could constitute a form of 'economic aggression.' And where the impact of economic coercion upon the target group
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article will attempt to determine what types of American retaliatory measures would be justifiable under existing principles of international law in response to a future Arab oil embargo and the
3
resultant economic strangulation which could conceivably result.
II.

THE FACT SITUATION:

STRANGULATION AND THE ARAB OIL WEAPON

A.

The Nation-State Petroleum Cartels: OPEC & OAPEC

Abderrahman Khene, the former Secretary-General of
OPEC, 4 has stated that the cartel was created "as a means of selfdefense" against unilateral price decisions made collectively by
privately owned multinational oil-companies with respect to the
natural resources of its member States. Prior to 1960, these international corporations held almost absolute control over both the
flow and the price of oil.
In 1948, the posted price of oil was established
by the companies at $2.17 per barrel. This price was gradually and unilaterresults in intense fear or anxiety (not at all demonstrable in this case),
the use of economic coercion could constitute a form of impermissible terroristic
strategy." Id. at 413, 414. See contra, Shihata, Destination Embargo of Arab Oil:
Its Legality Under International Law, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 591 (1974), who asserts, "Far
from being a 'weapon for blackmailing the West' or a 'threat to international
peace'; it has been employed as an instrument for the respect and promotion
of the rule of law in an area of international relations where such a rule has
long been forsaken for the rule of superior military force. In either use of that
instrument, Arab oil-exporting' countries were in fact following the steps of a
great number of other States which have used their export regulations to further
their foreign policies. Only the objective of the Arab States seems to have
been more legitimate. The Arab States took that measure not to weaken
unfriendly countries but merely to discourage third countries from violating
their obligations of neutrality toward them and from continuing their encouragement of, or their acquiescence in, an illegal situation." Id. at 625, 626.
3 Certainly, legal factors should not be the sole determinant of policymaking in any area of political importance, any more than militaiy, economic,
or other factors ought to be the sole determinant. Legal issues should, however, be an integral part of the decision-making process. Ehrlich, The Legal
Process in Foreign Affairs: Military Intervention - a Testing Case, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 637, 641 (1975).
4 OPEC consists of the following 12 States: Algeria, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq,
Indonesia, Kuwait, Liberia, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela. Canada is the only major Western exporter which is not
an OPEC member. The dozen OPEC nations account for 85 percent of all the
oil which moves in foreign commerce. These countries produce 54 percent of
all the oil in the world and hold 64 percent of the earth's currently proven reserves. OPEC is rapidly becoming the world's most powerful cartel, controlling the price and supply of a commodity which is the life blood of industrialized
societies, and vital to food production. OPEC's Oil and Money Machine: How
It Works, U. S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 28, 1974, at 37, 38.
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ally reduced by the oil companies to $1.80 by August of 1960.
The controlling multinational corporations asserted that these reductions were required because of excessive world supply and a
need to remain competitive in Japanese and European markets.
On the other hand, the oil-producing nations viewed these price
reductions as a threat to their own economic independence and
development, inasmuch as the taxes and royalties imposed upon
the posted price had previously been their principal sources of
income.S
Thus, OPEC was founded in 1960.

Its initial purposes were:

(a) to reverse the price reduction which the controlling corpora6
tions had instituted as a result of overcapacity; and (b) to defend
7
and stabilize the oil price structure which then existed. It was
originally established as a movement de resistance against arbitrary
and unilateral decisions by the major oil companies. It exists
,today as an association of nations dedicated to the protection of
s
their national interests in the production and exportation of oil.
OPEC :was viewed by its members as an organization having
economic goals. Following the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, several
Arab States felt that an additional organization should be created

which would employ petroleum resources as a political weapon to
achieve Arab goals vis-c-vis Israel. Consequently, the Organiza-

tion of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) was created in 1968. 9

OAPEC was established to enable the oil-producing nations
to present a united front to both the multinational petroleum
Its politico-economic
corporations and the consuming nations.

nature was characterized by Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Baki
5 Joelson & Griffin, The Legal Status of Nation-State Cartels Under United
States Antitrust and Public InternationalLaw, 9 INT'L LAW. 617, 618 (1975).
6 Muir, The Changing Legal Framework of International Energy Management, 9
INT'L LAW. 605, 607 (1975).
7 A study for the special committee of the U.S.

House Banking and Currency Committee concluded that the price cuts of 1959 and 1960 imposed by
the oil companies triggered the formation of OPEC. OPEC's Oil and Money
Machine: How it Works, U. S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 28, 1974, at 37.
s Amuzegar, OPEC in the Context of the Global Power Equation, 4 DEN. J.
The history and development of OPEC is analyzed
INT'L L. & POL'Y 221 (1974).
in Mirvahabi, Claims to the Oil Resources in the Persian Gulf: Will the World Economy
Be Controlled by the Gulf in the Future? 11 TEx. INT'L L. J. 75 (1976). Recent
dissension by certain OPEC nations over what the price of petroleum should
be has created severe economic and political strains within the organization.
See The Strain on OPEC, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 24, 1977, at 46.
9 Supra note 5, at 619.
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Yamini as "making oil a genuine weapon to serve the interest of
the producing countries and the Arab countries in general."10
B.

The Impending Crisis

The United States government could not reasonably contend
that the oil embargo of 1973 was an entirely unforseen modus
operandi of the Persian Gulf States. The short-lived embargo
placed on shipments of petroleum to the United States during
the Six-Day War" should have been ample warning for OAPEC's
action at Kuwait.
Typical of the rhetoric produced by Arab leaders prior to the
implementation of the embargo was this declaration made in an
international seminar on "Oil as a Weapon" which was held in
Baghdad during November of 1972:
Arab oil can and should be used against the imperialist aggression and occupation, for the liberation of Arab occupied
territory and the restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people, particularly the right of self-determination.2
In a study prepared prior to the October 1973 embargo for the
U.S. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, it was
expressly forseen that:
The growing proportion of total U.S. energy supply coming
from foreign sources, or from particular regions, blocs or coun-

tries, magnifies the potential impact on the U. S. economy from

a variety of contingencies including wars or international political confrontations and insurrection or sabotage in the producing regions. Moreover, the recent effectiveness of the cartel
of petroleum exporting countries and explicit threats by many
of them, have raised the chilling possibility of a general or
selective embargo by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), all the Arab countries, or some other
large bloc of exporters to enforce their economic or political
demands. To offset or deter any of these contingencies, the

10G. STOCKING, MIDDLE EAST OIL 459 (1970). See Boorman, Economic Coercion in International Law: The Arab Oil Weapon and the Ensuing Juridical Issues, 9
J. INTL L. & ECON. 205 (1974).
11Boorman, supra note 10, at 207. That effort lasted from June 4 to August
29, 1967, and was aborted due to the tremendous loss of revenues to Arab oilproducing States and the negligible effect upon the United States. However, in
1973, increased demand by consuming States and effectively concerted action
which precluded most transshipments, combined with the unavailability of
alternative sources in required quantities, operated to make the oil embargo a
highly effective political and economic weapon. Id. at 207-208.
12THE

PERMANENT

SECRETARIAT

ORGANIZATION, OIL AS A WEAPON

OF

25 (1972).

THE

AFRo-ASIAN

PEOPLES'

SOLIDARITY
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United States currently has neither a significant reserve of producing capacity relative to the current or expected volume of
imports (as it had during earlier Middle East crises) nor significant oil storage capacity.13
In August of 1973, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia emphasized
that although his government did not want to "place any restriction on our oil exports to the United States . . . America's
complete support of Zionism against Arabs makes it extremely difficult for us to continue to supply U.S. petroleum needs and
even to maintain our friendly relations with the United States."'14
C.

Yom Kippur and the Arab Oil Embargo: RIP

On October 6, 1973, a number of Arab States launched an
armed attack upon Israeli forces situated in territory which had
been seized by Israel during the Six-Day War of 1967.15 Within
24 hours, the Executive Committee of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization requested an immediate cessation of the production
of all Arab oil. Three days after the outbreak of hostilities,
Kuwait called an emergency meeting of Arab oil ministers for a
discussion of "the role of oil in light of current developments."16
On October 15, the U.S. Department of State announced that
the United States had begun to resupply Israel with military
7
equipment.'
On October 17, 1973, 11 days after the fourth Arab-Israeli
war erupted, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OAPEC), meeting in Kuwait, decreed the imposition
of oil embargoes and cutbacks in an effort to support the Arab at13The study was not, however,
A.

TUSSING,

TOWARD

A

RATIONAL

released

POLICY

FOR

until after October
OIL AND

GAS

IMPORTS

of 1973.
4 (1973).

Compare B. BRODIE, FOREIGN OIL AND AMERICAN SECURITY (1947).
14Quoted in Boorman, supra note 10, at 205-206.
15See Black October: Old Enemies at War Again, TIME, Oct. 15, 1973, at
30;
The War of the Day of Judgment, TIME, Oct. 22, 1973, at 28; The Mideast
Erupts,
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 15, 1973, at 38.
The Yom Kippur War was the costliest and most dangerous military engagement in 25 years of Middle East tension.
Winding Up War, Working Toward
Peace, TIME, Nov. 5, 1973, at 37. In 18 days of ferocious fighting, as
many as
7,700 Egyptians, 7,700 Syrians and 4,500 Israelis were killed or wounded
- the
largest number of casualties for all three nations in any war since 1948.
Brilliant
Moves in Final Battle, TIME, Nov. 5, 1973, at 44.
16 Shihata,
Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its Legality Under International
Law, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 591, 592 (1974).
17On October 19, President Nixon requested that Congress appropriate
$2,200 million for the current fiscal year in military assistance to Israel.
Id.
at 594.
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tempt to regain territory lost to Israel during the 1967 conflict.
These Arab nations agreed: (a) to reduce overall production by at

least 5 percent, with an escalation of an additional 5 percent for
each succeeding month until all Israeli forces had been withdrawn
from Arab territories, (b) to embargo all exports of petroleum to

the United States, and (c) to reward "friendly"

nations by as-

suring them of continued petroleum supplies at their monthly
averages for the first 9 months of 1973.
Meeting again in Kuwait on November 4, 1973, Arab utilization of the oil weapon was expanded to a 25 percent cutback in
production with an additional 5 percent scheduled for December 1
and every month thereafter until Arab political demands had been

satisfied.18
In accordance with their decision, Abu Dhabi, Algeria and
Libya ceased shipment of the 520,000 barrels a day which they
had previously sold to the United States. Saudi Arabia cut off
600,000 barrels a day to the United States. Previously, six Persian
Gulf States had broken off negotiations with Western19 oil companies and increased the posted price of oil by 70 percent.
In a communiqu6 issued on December 8, the Arab oil min-

isters expressed a willingness to lift the oil embargo against the
United States with the beginning of the implementation of a schedule of withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territories occupied
since 1967.10
On March 18, 1974, 5 months after the initiation of the embargo by Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhab-i, most of the Arab States,
oil
meeting in Vienna, announced their intention to terminate the
21
countries.
other
embargo against the United States and certain
18See Unsheathing the Political Weapon, TIME, Oct. 29, 1973, at 46; Bennsky,
Department Testifies on Arab Oil Embargoes, 69 DEP'T STATE BULL. 770 (1973).
these
Of the 10 member states of OAPEC, only Iraq refused to abide by
M. ISKANDAR, THE ARAB OIL QUESTION 1 (2nd ed. 1974).
recommendations.
Four of the largest producers (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria and Qatar)
Still Tightening the Blockage,
decreed immediate reductions of 10 percent.
55.
at
1973,
5,
Nov.
TIME,
19THE EcONOMIST, Oct. 20, 1973, at 66. Boorman, supra note 10, at 207. 16
MIDDLE EAST EcoN. SURVEY, No. 52, Oct. 19, 1973, at i.
3) Supra note 16, at 596.
21 Iraq refused to attend' the Vienna meeting, and Libya and Syria refused
to lend their "assent" to the lifting of the embargo or to any increase in overall
Moreover, Algeria indicated that it was only lifting the embargo
production.
temporarily, until June 1. Additionally, it was not decided that the oil embargo
against Denmark, The Netherlands, Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa should
be ended. Paust & Blaustein, The Arab Oil Weapon - A Threat to International
Peace, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 410, 412 (1974).
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III.

A.

ECONOMIC COERCION AS AGGRESSION

The Intent of the Actors

It is not to be doubted that a great deal of economic activity
initiated by a State in the interest of optimizing its economic selfinterests causes a concomitant injury to the economic values held
by other States.2 The structure of the world economic system
contains inherent inequities which cause unavoidably detrimental
consequences to innocent participants. The economic laws by
which international trade and commerce are governed bestow
wealth upon some nations and poverty upon others.
It does not appear desirable to constrain all forms of persuasive activity initiated by one State over another, for in an
interdependent -world it is necessary (or, indeed, vital as a sanctioning device in international law) that States be permitted to exercise some measure of influence over the policies and conduct of
their neighbors in the world community. It does appear desirable,
however, in an efficient system of world public order, that forms
of coercive activity, which might be unnecessarily or unreasonably
destructive to the essential values of an innocent target State, or
which might significantly endanger international peace and security, be effectively regulated or even prohibited.
These types of inevitable economic injury are to be sharply
distinguished from various types of intentional injury which have
been utilized in various degrees by States intending to wage economic warfare. The latter includes, but by no means is limited
to: (a) Freezing a target's assets; (b) imposing import and export
embargoes; (c) blacklisting foreign firms and individuals who
deal with the target; (d) reducing foreign supplies by preclusive
purchasing; (e) manipulating foreign exchange markets; (f) withdrawing or refusing credit; and (g) creating artificial scarcity
and high prices. 23
Perhaps an appropriate consideration which might lend some
assistance to the determination of whether various economic measures employed by a State should or should not be considered
illegal per se is that which has been suggested by Professor
Bowett - whether the action taken by the involved State can be
attributed to an improper motive or intent. 24 A determination
22See also M. McDOUGAL
PUBLIC ORDER 197 (1961).
23See M.
(1964).

McDOUGAL

24See Bowett,

&

&

F.

Assoc.,

FELICIANO,
STUDIES

LAW

AND

IN WORLD

MINIMUM
PUBLIC

WORLD

ORDER

266

Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States, 13 VA. J. INT'L L.
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that the predominant purpose of the acting State was to cause an
illegitimate deprivation or destruction of values of the target State,
rather than a virtuous attainment of ends (that is, maximization
of legitimate values) might be considered as prima facie or even
conclusive evidence of illegality. Thus, the mens rea of the
OAPEC actors shall now be examined in an effort to determine
their culpability.
The avowed purpose of the partial embargo and production
cutbacks of October 1973 as expressed at the initiation thereof
was "the liberation of the Arab territories occupied in the 1967
War and the recovery of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian
'
people in accordance with the United Nations resolutions."
Upon termination of these coercive economic measures, the
Vienna communiqu6 emphasized that their primary purpose had
been "to draw the attention of the world to the Arab cause in
order to create the suitable political climate for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 which calls for the complete withdrawal from the Arab-occupied territories and for the
restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people."26
It is argued by the Arabs that not only did the 1967 Israeli
attack upon Arab forces constitute an illegal military aggression,
but the occupation by Israel of the Sinai Peninsula, the West
Bank of the Jordan River and the Golan Heights of Syria since
the war also represents a continuous infringement upon the territorial sovereignty of the partially-occupied States, and thereby
constitutes illegal conquest.
Resolution 242, proposed by Great Britain and adopted unanimously by the Security Council in November 1967, emphasizes
"the inadmissability of the acquisition of territory by war" and
calls upon the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." The implementation of
this resolution was an express objective of both the Arab attack
upon Israeli forces in October of 1973 and the Arab oil embargo.
The U.N. system requires that States utilize peaceful means
to accomplish legitimate ends, at least in the first instance, and
1, 5 (1972). Professor Bowett suggests that three types of economic coercion
could readily be classified as illegal (economic coercion in violation of (a)
specific treaty commitments, (b) general principles of international law, or (c)
the principles of non-intervention). Id. at 2-3.
This resolu21 17 MIDDLE EAST ECON. SURVEY, No. 4, Nov. 16, 1973, at iii.
tion of 17 October 1973, is quoted in full in Shihata, sipra note 16, at 593. See
also Mc Peak, Israel: Borders and Security, 54 Fo. AFF. 426 (1976).
a, 17 MIDDLE EAST EcON. SURVEY, No. 22, Mar. 22, 1974, at 1, 6.
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the involved Arab States had tried in vain for 6 years to regain
allegedly illegally occupied territory. It has been argued, that:
Governmental action taken by a State within its own territory for the restoration of legal order disrupted by unauthorized acts of others certainly falls within the inherent territorial
jurisdiction of each sovereign State. Although such action may
be based on the exercise of the State's traditional right to selfhelp under customary international law or under a broad reading of the U. N. Charter provisions on self-defense, one need
not argue the relevance of such concepts in regards to the Egyptian and Syrian measures. The denial to Egypt and Syria, in
the particular circumstance of the situation, of the right to
take individual or collective action would have resulted in fact
in depriving them indefinitely of their essential right to territorial integrity, guaranteed by the U. N. Charter. Without
such a right, state jurisdiction, let alone sovereignty, would
be nothing but a sham. This obviously explains the fact that
not a single state or international organization has characterized the Egyptian and Syrian measures of October 1973 as
illegal or even unwarranted.27
Although the Declaration on Friendly Relations contains certain prohibitions with respect to the unrestrained employment of
economic coercive measures (see discussion below), it nevertheless provides that:
The territory of a State shall not be the object of military
occupation resulting from the use of force in contravention of
the provisions of the Charter. The territory of a State shall
not be the object of acquisition by another State resulting from
the threat or use of force. No territorial acquisition resulting
from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal.28
B.

The United Nations System

1.

U. N. Resolutions and Declarations
a.

Economic Restraint: Aggression, Coercion
and Friendly Relations

It is inevitable that, in an attempt to assert legal control over
the use of force in the settlement of disputes between nations,
members of the international community should strive to define
the word "aggression."
During the last 50 years, numerous unsuccessful attempts have been made by both the League of Na27Supra note 16, at 607-608.
28 G.A.
Res.
A/8028 (1970).

2625,

25

U.N.

GAOR,

Supp.

(No.

28)

121,

U.N.

Doc.
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tions and the United Nations to arrive at an acceptable definition. 29 Today, the concept may be of enormous importance
under Articles 39 and 51 of the U. N. Charter.
The term "economic aggression" was employed as early as
1916 by the British delegation at the Paris Conference in the drafting of a resolution calling for joint action after the war by the Allies to protect their economic interests against German "economic
aggression" by "necessary measures of self-defense. " 3
More
recently, a rather vague definition of aggression formulated by
Bolivia provides:
. ..unilateral action whereby a state is deprived of economic
resources derived from the proper conduct of international trade
or its basic economy is endangered so that its security is affected and it is unable to act in its own defense or to cooperate
in the collective defense of peace shall likewise be deemed to
constitute an act of aggression.31
The Soviet Union has favored a comprehensive, enumerative
definition of aggression specifically providing that economic
aggression is committed whenever a State ". . . takes against
another State measures of economic pressure violating its sovereignty and economic independence and threatening the bases of
its economic life" or "subjects another State to an economic
blockade."32 These formulations recognize the principle that, as
world trade expands and economic interdependencies flourish, a
concurrent growth in the vulnerability of States to economic coercion arises. With the development and refinement of methods
of economic warfare, the flow of goods in the international arena
Piper, The Legal Control of the Use of Force and the Definition of Aggression, 2 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (Supp. 1) (1972); Engel & Taulbee, Discussion
on the Problem of Defining Aggression, 2 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 39 (Supp. I) (1972).
The historical development may be traced in the following publications: Report
of the 1956 Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 7 U.N.
GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 54) 17, U.N. Doc. A/2211 (1952); 5 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 719-873 (1965).
30D. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 106 (1958).
31 Article 16 of the Charter of the Organization of American States provides,
"No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic
or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and
obtain from it advantages of any kind."
Signed at Bogota, 30 April 1948;
entered into force 13 December 1951. Pan-Am T.S. No. 23; 119 U.N.T.S. 48-92.
Revised as Article 19 by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, 27 February 1967. PanAm T.S. No. 1-B; OAS Official Records, OEA/Ser. A/2, Add. 2 (1967) 1-58.
3 Report of the 1956 Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 12 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 30, U.N. Doc. A/3574 (1957).
See Piper, supra note 29, at 9. Soviet Union, Draft Resolution, 18 October
1954, A/C.6/L.332/Rev. 1; GAOR, Annexes (IX) (No. 51), at 6-7.
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can conceivably be so managed as to inflict a significant measure of coercion upon a target State. 33 Nowhere has this principle been more clearly demonstrated than in the 5 month Arab
embargo of petroleum, which so substantially disrupted the economy of the industrialized world that thinking people were forced
to contemplate the very real threat that without fuel the wheels of
international industry would grind to a halt.
The U.N. General Assembly has, on a number of occasions,
condemned economic means of coercion. For example, the U. N.
Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention expressly provides:
"No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or
any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to
obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign
rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind."34
The Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security
of Mankind specified that: "The intervention by the authorities
of a State in the internal or external affairs of another State, by
means of coercive measures of an economic or political character
in order to force its will and thereby obtain advantages of any
kind." '
The U.N. General Assembly's Declaration of the Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States, which is generally viewed as its most
authoritative declaration of contemporary international law,
emphasizes "the duty of states to refrain in their international relations from military, political, economic or any other form of
coercion aimed against the political independence or territorial
integrity of any state . . ." It specifically declares that:
No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order
to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it the advantages of any
kind)6

Article (2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights of 1966 provides that the disposal of natural
33 M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 22, at 196.

' G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 12, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1965).
35Adopted by the International Law Commission, 28 July 1954. 9 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954).
3 G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 123, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970). See also G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 12, U.N.
Doc. A/6220 (1965); G.A. Res. 3016, 27 U.N. GAOR (1972); G.A. Res. 3171,
28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
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wealth and resources must not prejudice "any obligation arising
out of international economic co-operation, based on the principle
of mutual benefit, and international law," and "[i]n no case
may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence." 37
Indeed, economic aggression may be as detrimental to a State's
security and, if illegal, as dangerous a violation of a State's essential rights as the use of force.38 It would seem that no inherent
reason exists why the economic policies of a State should not
be considered as aggression if in fact they endanger international
39
peace and security.
Nevertheless, the majority of Representatives to the Sixth
Committee of the General Assembly and in the Special Committees of 1953 and 1956 on the question of defining aggression
have apparently assumed that the right of self-defense is restricted to a riposte to the use of force and that forcible action
cannot be a lawful reaction to economic aggression. 40 The reluctance surrounding its inclusion in a definition of aggression apparently stems from the fears that the Security Council would
have been given unlimited power under Article 39 to label various
forms of non-military coercive conduct as aggression, 41 and that
States might assert the right of self-defense under Article 51 to
justify the utilization of armed force in order to repel infringements upon their economic values. As to the former anxiety,
it must be recognized that a multitude of coercive alternatives
exist which do not fall within the war-peace dichotomy but
which may nevertheless have economic, social and political
consequences unfortunately similar to those of armed intervention. It might, therefore, be desirable for the Security Council
to possess some measure of latitude in determining that various
forms of non-military coercive conduct constitute aggression. As
to the fear that its inclusion "might suggest the right to go to
war in self-defense" against "economic aggression,"42 such con37 Paust & Blaustein, supra note 21, at 422.
3 Supra note 30, at 24.
39Id. at 261. One of the primary purposes of the United Nations is the

maintenance of international
para. 1.
40I.

BROWNLIE,

peace and security.

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

AND

See U.N. Charter art. 1,

THE USE OF FORCE BY

STATES

254-55

(1963).
41 Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 9 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 11) 9, 10, U.N. Doc. A/2638 (1953).
42 See McDougal & Feliciano, Legal Regulation of Resort to International Coercion: Aggression and Self-Defense in Policy Perspective, 68 YALE L. J. 1057, 1115
(1959).
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duct would appear to be circumscribed by the established prerequisites to the exercise of self-defense under customary international law: (a) Actual necessity, and (b) proportionality in
responding coercion. 43 It would seem that such limitations
would place an onerous burden upon a State attempting to provide a legal justification for the utilization of military means in
response to economic coercion. (See discussion below.)
Moreover, at least one authority vigorously opposes the considerable emphasis which has been placed on the interrelation
of the concepts of aggression and self-defense - an emphasis
which supports the theory that aggression gives rise to the right
of self-defense.
Professor Bowett argues that the concept of
military aggression is entirely too limited for there to be any real
correlation between a definition of aggression and a definition
of self-defense based upon the need to protect the security of a
State against forms of illegal conduct other than the employment of military force. 44 The purpose of the concept of aggression, he asserts, is to define the circumstances in which the
competent organs of the collective security system will take
action to maintain international peace and security; while the
concept of self-defense defines situations in which a State may
employ forceful means to protect those essential rights upon which
its security depends.45
"It is submitted that in considering
whether a situation affords a State the right of self-defense the
only relevant concept is that of self-defense; the concept of
aggression, as it has been elaborated during the course of the
last forty years, has an entirely different purpose and can afford
no guide to the question of whether a right of self-defense
exists. "46
Thus, the fact that economic coercion has not been accepted
within the definition of aggression for the purpose of organs of international security bears no relation to the question of whether,
against such indirect forms of highly injurious conduct, the individual State whose own security is endangered has the legal
right to resort to self-defense. 47

43 Supra note 33, at 195-196.

44Supra note 30, at 250.
45Id. at 256.

46Id. at 261.
47See supra note 30, at 261.
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b. Economic Freedom: Pre- and Post-Embargo Resolutions
The exclusive control by a State over its natural resources
was recognized in Resolution 1803 of the General Assembly which
provided: "The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the
48
The General
well-being of the people of the state concerned."
Assembly reaffirmed and extended this principle subsequent to
the initiation of the Arab oil embargo when, on December 12,
1974, it adopted the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States over the vigorous objections expressed by the United States
and certain other industrialized nations. This Charter reflects a
specific bias toward developing States and memorializes the right
of developing countries to engage in concerted action in the dis49
For example, Article 5 proposition of their natural resources.
vides:
All states have the right to associate in organizations of
primary commodity producers in order to develop their natural
resources to achieve stable financing for their development, and
in pursuance of their aims assisting in the promotion of sustained growth of the world economy, in particular accelerating
the development of developing countries.50
Article 5 reinforces this right by imposing upon States which
are not members of the cartel a duty "to respect that right by
refraining from applying economic and political measures that
would limit it," presumably even if the cartel is guilty of coercion
under international law, and regardless of whether such "measures" themselves constitute coercion. The last sentence of Article
7 further reinforces this right by imposing upon States a duty
"to cooperate in order to eliminate obstacles that hinder" the
mobilization and utilization by another State of its resources
5
through any means of its choosing. '

18G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217

(1962); 2 INT'L LEGAL

MATS.

223 (1963).

& Tepe, Jr., The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A
Reflection or Rejection of InternationalLaw? 9 INT'L LAW. 295, 314 (1975).
A/9030
50 G.A. Res. 3175, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 55, U.N. Doc.
49 Brower

(1973); The United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: Recom-

mendation and Report of the U.N. Second Committee to the General Assembly, 9
LAWYER

385, 390 (1975).

51 Supra

note 49, at 315.
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2.

The U.N. Charter
It is well established that a certain degree of economic
coer-

cion is inevitable in a State's day-to-day

interaction.

Funda-

mental community policy does not seek to prohibit
such coercion,
inasmuch as it does not appear to pose a significant
threat to
the existing system of minimum world public order.52
Articles

2(4) and 51 of the U.N.

Charter are deemed by Professors

McDougal and Feliciano to be among the several
provisions of
the Charter which provide a basis for a system of
world public
order.S3
Article 2(4) of the Charter requires that all members
refrain
from certain types of impermissible coercion. It
provides:
All Members shall refrain in their national relations
from
the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other
manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
The question immediately arises as to what types
of force are
contemplated by the Article. Is it limited in
its applicability to
"armed aggression," or does it apply
broadly to cover aggregious
forms of "economic coercion"?
Certainly, it must be realized
that various forms of non-military coercion can
have at least as
deleterious an effect upon a target State as certain
forms of armed
coercion, and thereby constitute as substantial
a threat to the
maintenance of international peace and security.
Could it have
been the intent of the framers to permit the former
to go totally
unregulated, while concentrating solely upon the
latter?
Perhaps the strongest argument for a broad interpretation
of
Article 2(4) is to be found in the language of the
provision itself.s4
52

Supra note 33, at 197.

53

Id. at 126-127.

For an elaboration of the argument that a
broad interpretation should
be given the concept of "force" within Article
2(4), and that, in particular, its
definition encompasses economic as well as
political coercion, we Comment,
54

The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Legality Under
Article 2(4) of the Charter
of the United Nations, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 983 (1974).
The argument for an
expansive interpretation of the principles contained
in the U.N. Charter included the following assertion:
The United Nations Charter has a constitutional character,
and it is
an axiom of constitution-drafting that the instrument
must be imbued
with enough force and clarity to make it effective,
and yet have
enough flexibility and expansiveness to ensure
against obsolescence.
The framers were undoubtedly aware of the possibility
that new forms
of international coercion would rise to prominence
in
future generations. They
must also have known that these changes in the
complex-
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The framers did not embelish the word "force" with restrictive
adjectives which would have effectively limited its scope. Yet
of
they could not have been unaware of the inherent vagueness
such as in
the word. Where they intended to restrict its scope,
by
ambiguities
Article 46, they affirmatively eliminated the patent
5
It must be emphasized,
utilization of the adjective "armed."
within the definicoercion
economic
of
however, that the inclusion
theory
gladiatorial
the
alter
not
tion of force in Article 2(4) does
as
long
so
trade,
of survival which governs the arena of world
underthe stakes remain commercial. It is only when a nation
intakes to utilize its economic power "against the territorial
other
any
in
or
state,
any
of
tegrity or political independence
Nations"
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
that the norm of Article 2(4) is violated.56
the presArticle 51 of the Charter provides that "Nothing in
or
individual
of
right
inherent
ent Charter shall impair the
Mema
against
occurs
collective self-defense if an armed attack
51 retains a
ber of the United Nations . . ."57 Thus, Article
itself
State's inherent right to individually or collectively defend
These
when its fundamental values are threatened by aggression.
responses,
armed
defensive measures are not expressly limited to
coercion
but may presumably include other forms of responding
(for example, economic embargoes). Thus, when read together,
or utilizaArticles 2(4) and 51 of the Charter prohibit the threat
or
Charter
the
by
authorized
tion of force by a State except as
in
State
another
for individual or collective self-defense against
integrity.
the preservation of political independence or territorial
its inflamion of international compulsion would in no way diminish
The
peace.
matory character or the attending dangers to world
efremain
to
was
it
if
open-ended
be
to
had
language of article 2(4)
Constitufective as a behavioral norm; the history of the United States
for liberty
tion has shown the necessity of formulating new protections
Similarly the Charter of the United Nations
as new dangers arise.
that are
must either permit or even encourage the evolution of norms
of an irrele- responsive to new dangers, or be relegated to the status
repugnant
vant historical document. Such an event would clearly be
wrote it.
to the spirit of the Charter and the intention of those who
Id. at 999.
55 id. at 997.
56 Id. at 1009.

57Such defensive measures may continue "until the Security Council has
and security."
taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace
of defensive
measures
that
recognizes
Charter
the
Thus,
51.
art.
U.N. Charter,
existence
very
its
or
values
of
self-help may be essential to a State's preservation
acted uneffectively
has
Council
Security
the
before
period
interim
during the
der Chapter VII.
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These are circumstances when the utilization of such coercive
measures would have been lawful under pre-existing principles of
customary international law.
C.

Customary InternationalLaw

It has been traditionally recognized that foreign trade is
exclusively a matter of national sovereignty. International commerce has frequently been manipulated in order to advance
foreign policy objectives and to achieve political ends. History
is replete with examples where restrictions upon both imports
and exports have been employed for purposes of exerting diplomatic pressure upon a target State.5 8 Professor Eagleton has
asserted: "A state is free to set up almost any barrier to trade and
intercourse against one or all states. She may prohibit trade
entirely, or in certain articles, or with certain states; she may
establish high tariffs against some or all States so far as customary international law is concerned (though there are many
treaty limitations). "59s Moreover, it has been observed:
That the regulation of foreign trade is normally a right
within the sovereign prerogatives of an independent country is
too well established to permit disagreement in the context of
existing international law. Individual nations have historically
regulated imports by imposing tariffs, inspections, quantitative
and qualitative restrictions, and numerous other conditions and
barriers to international trade. They have frequently regulated exports as well, including recently, complete cut-offs
where deemed necessary to retain adequate domestic supply
without inflation. The question, then, is whether such regulation becomes illicit when directed against a particular country
or countries for purposes of diplomatic pressure. 60
1.

The Customary InternationalPractice of States: The American Example

The economic practices and legislative promulgations of the
United States provide a standard by which to judge the legality
or illegality of the OAPEC embargo.
The United States severed all trade relations with Cuba
following its expropriation in 1961 of all American-owned prop-

58 See also Schwarzenberger, An Evolving Economic World Order? 1 RUT.-CAM.
L.J. 243, 250 (1969).
59 C. EAGLETON, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT 86, 87 (3rd ed. 1957).
60 Muir, The Boycott in International Law, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 187, 192
(1974). See also Bowett, supra note 24, at 5.
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erty without compensation. 61 The Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 authorized the President to "establish and maintain a total
2
embargo upon all trade between the United States and Cuba,"6
and thereby established the municipal law foundation upon which
President Kennedy based the institution of the embargo on commercial activity between the two nations in February of 1962.63
The U.S. municipal law statutory bases for the manipulation
of economic activity for the achievement of political ends are quite
numerous. 64 For example, United States corporations and their
controlled subsidiaries are prohibited by the Trading with the
Enemy Act of 1917 from engaging in foreign commercial transactions with certain specified nations during any period of naThe Trade
tional emergency declared by the President.65
products
tariff
concessions
for
Act
of
1962
prohibits
Expansion
of Communist nations, and permits the President to regulate the
importation of any. commodity deemed to threaten the national
security. 66 The Export Control Act of 1949 declares that the
economic policy of the United States shall be to utilize export
controls in the furtherance of U.S. foreign policy and "to
exercise the necessary vigilance over exports from the standpoint
of their significance to national security."6 7 This Act was reCuban Law No. 851, expropriating all American property in Cuba,
described the U.S. action in amending the Sugar Act of 1948 so as to drastically
reduce the Cuban sugar quota as "aggression, for political purposes, against
the basic interests of the Cuban economy." The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307
F. 2d 845 (1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), concluded that
the "legislative history made it abundantly clear that the main purpose of the
amendment was to impose a sanction against an unfriendly nation." 307 F.2d
845, 865 (1962). However, it nevertheless determined that "we cannot find
any established principle of international jurisprudence that requires a nation to
continue buying commodities from an unfriendly source." Id. at 866. The U.S.
action, if indeed an economic sanction, may perhaps best be regarded as a reprisal against "the discriminatory, aggressive and injurious economic policies
of the Castro regime." Department of State Press Release No. 600 (Oct. 19,
1960), 43 DEP'T STATE BULL. 715, 716 (1960). See Bowett, Economic Coercion
and Reprisals By States, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 3-4 (1972), and Boorman, supia
note 10, at 226.
62 U.S.C. § 2370 (1961).
63 Pres. Proc. 3477, 3 C.F.R. § 157 (1962).
64 See Shihata, supra note 16, at 609-611, and Muir, supra note 60, at 192-193.
See
65 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1970), 31 C.F.R. % 500.101-809 (1972).
Comment, The Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 and Foreign-Based Subsidiaries of American Multinational Corporations: A Time to Abstain from Refraining, 11
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 206 (1973).
6619 U.S.C. § 1861-62 (1970).
67 Act of February 26, 1949, ch. 11, § 2, 63 Stat. 7; 19.U.S.C. § 2021 (1949).
61 The
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placed by the Export Administration Act of 1969 which expressly
affirms the principle that the, United States is "to use its economic resources and trade potential . . . to further its national
security and foreign policy objectives," and provides the President not only with power to prescribe regulations governing exports from the United States, but also to prohibit exportation "to
any nation or combination of nations threatening the national
security of the United States."68 Pursuant to this legislation,
the U.S. Department of Commerce has promulgated export
licensing requirements and virtually eliminated exportation to
Communist nations of certain designated "strategic" commodities .69
The Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, more
commonly referred to as the Battle Act, emphasizes the policy
of the United States to proscribe the exportation of various
strategic commodities, including petroleum, to nations threatening
U. S. security, including the Soviet Union. 70
Clearly, both the express policy and actual practice of the
United States is to utilize economic manipulative means freely
to achieve desired political ends. For example, Ecuador argued
that the United States used illegal political and economic force
in its suspension of sales of military hardware in response to
Ecuadorian seizure of American fishing vessels within its
claimed territorial waters.
More recently, it has been asserted that the United States,
in its utilization of aggressive forms of economic manipulative
pressure (for example, eliminating and disrupting U.S. and international credit), undermined the stability of the Allende govern1
ment and contributed to its downfall.7
2.

Customary Wartime Practice of States

The right of a belligerent State in time of war to resort to
measures of economic warfare against its adversary and to apply
economic sanctions against third States which violate their
obligations of neutrality is manifest. The imposition of economic
pressure upon the enemy has always been deemed. legitimate.
Although economic warfare has traditionally played only a secondary role, it has become of primary importance in modern
6850 U.S.C. app. § 2402-2403 (1970).
69See 15 C.F.R. % 370.1(a), 370.3(a)(ii), 378.1, 379.4 (1970).
- 22 U.S.C. 5 1611 (1951).
71Supra note 54, at 1007.
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The result is that, although war is still primarily a

confrontation of nations and their armed forces, the civilian population is no longer immune from the hardships and privations of
war.
The duty of impartiality must prevent a neutral from supplying belligerents with arms, ammunition, vessels, and military
provisions, whether for money or gratuitously. A neutral State
which sold arms and ammunition to a belligerent at a profit,
or supplied them as a gift, would violate the duty of impartiality. 72
In the Alabama Claims arbitration, it was determined that
Great Britain had violated its duties as a neutral by failing to
prevent its nationals from constructing a number of vessels for
use by the Confederate Navy in the War Between the States.
Certainly, the United States today has violated its status of
neutrality by directly supplying Israel with massive military as73
sistance.
Article 6 of the Hague Convention of 1907 Respecting the
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War prohibits
"the supply in any manner, directly or indirectly, by a neutral
Power to a belligerent, of warships, ammunition or war material
of any kind whatever."74
Customary practice suggests that the nation imposing economic sanctions need not even be a belligerent in the hostilities.
For example, during the early portion of World War II, the United
States, although a declared neutral, imposed an embargo upon
the sale of oil and scrap iron and steel to various nations, including
Spain, Portugal and Japan.
It is in this context that one must remember that the United
States has traditionally been the primary supplier of armaments
and munitions to Israel. In fact, only 9 days after the outbreak
72 Id. at

738-739.
Economic warfare has not traditionally limited itself only to boycotts and
embargoes, but has encompassed naval blockades of both the imports and exports of belligerent enemy States. See W. MALLISON, JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW
OF

NAVAL

(1966);
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of the Yom Kippur War, the United States had begun to resupply
Israel with military equipment.
Four days thereafter, President
Nixon requested that Congress appropriate more than $2 billion
in military assistance to Israel for fiscal year 1974.
It is argued that the Arab oil-exporting nations, as participants in the hostilities of October 1973 in varying degrees, were
entitled to take retaliatory measures against such neutral powers
as the United States which had supplied Israel with massive
quantities of war materials, some of which were reported to have
been delivered directly in occupied Arab territories.
International law has historically recognized and provided for
the use of economic sanctions by one combatant against another
during a time of war. The employment of economic measures
against neutrals gained wide currency during the Napoleonic wars,
and has today become an accepted part of our vocabulary of
"total war." The Arab policy of regulating the supply
of crude
oil in response to the posture of consuming nations with respect
to the Middle East situation was a predictable and perhaps
expansive application of this tradition. At present, there is apparently no principle of international law which prohibits an
embargo per se in the absence of applicable treaties. Foreign
trade has always been viewed as a matter solely within the prerogative of sovereign governments. The general principles contained in the Doctrine on Friendly Relations (to refrain from economic coercion) and in the United Nations Charter (to abstain
from acts which threaten the peace) have been universally
ignored in the arena of foreign trade75
3.

The Customary Practice of InternationalOrganizations

It must be recognized that the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74
was ostensibly a concerted undertaking of an international organization (OAPEC) rather than a coercive measure taken by
independent non-aligned States.
Furthermore, the utilization of
economic means by international organizations to attain political
ends (whether legitimate or illegitimate) neither began nor ended
with the OAPEC embargo.
The framers recognized in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
that certain forms of non-military intervention in the affairs of
States might constitute a threat to the peace, breach of the peace
or an act of aggression, and that pursuant to Article 39, such a
75 See supra note 54, at 1007.
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determination could be made by the Security Council. Moreover,
Article 41 permits the Security Council, in order to implement
its decisions, to utilize various economic coercive measures including the "complete or partial interruption of economic relations . . .
The Security Council has made widespread use of these coer77
7°
cive tools against both South Africa and Rhodesia by initiating
The
embargoes on various commodities, including petroleum.
General Assembly also has recommended that States observe
embargoes on the shipment of petroleum 7 8to, for example, the
People's Republic of China and North Korea.
The Organization of American States has instituted boycotts
on a variety of products, including petroleum, from the Dominican
Republic and Cuba.7 9 Similarly, the Organization of African
Unity has called for the imposition of embargoes, particularly
on the supply of oil, against Israel, Portugal, South Africa and
Rhodesia. 80
4.

Customary Self-Defense: Necessity & Proportionality

The customary international law requirements for the assertion
of a claim of lawful self-defense traditionally have been framed
in terms of: (a) actual necessity and (b) proportionality in responding coercion8i
The Arab view has always been that continued Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory, 82 and, in particular, the territories
of Egypt, Jordan and Syria, constitutes a violation of the sovereignty of the Arab States in total disregard of Security Council

191, 19 U.N. SCOR, 1964 Resolutions and Decisions of the Se76 See Res.
curity Council 13, 15 (1966); Res. 282, 25 U.N. SCOR, 1970 Resolutions and

Decisions of:the Security Council 11, 12 (1971).
21 U.N. SCOR, 1966 Resolutions and Decisions of the Security
17 Res. 221,
Council 5-7 (1968); Res. 232, 23 U.N. SCOR, 1968 Resolutions and Decisions
of the Security Council 5 (1970).
78 G.A. Res. 500, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20A) Add. 1, U.N. Doc.
A/1557 (1965). See L. SOHN, THE UNITED NATIONS IN ACTION 93-111 (1968).
79See Muir, supra note 60, at 191.
"I Shihata, supra note 16, at 620-621.
Interdiction: National
Si See Mallison, Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine GEo. WASH. L.
31
Law,
International
and Collective Defense Claims Valid Under
REV. 335 (1962).
82 See Note, The Palestinian People and Their Political, Military and Legal
Status in the World Community, 5 N.C. CENTRAL L. J. 326, 328 (1974); Akehurst,
The Arab.Israeli Conflict and International Law, 5 N. Z. U. L. REV. 231-33 (1973).
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Resolution 242. In 6 years, Israel had not relinquished control
over a single square inch of occupied real estate.8 3 In fact,
Israel today controls six times more territory than it did in 1948.
It, therefore, appeared necessary to the Arab States to force
implementation of what they perceived to be the rule of law.
The military strength of Israel seemed so formidable that the
surrounding Arab States could not forcibly regain control over
their respective sovereign territories. The OAPEC nations were
without the substantial military means to assist Egypt and Syria
in their attack launched in October 1973.
Nevertheless, the
OAPEC States had at their disposal the enormous economic
leverage necessary to bring requisite pressure to bear on the world
community and, in particular, the United States which, by its
moral and material support, had enabled Israel to retain military
control for so long. The embargo's focus upon the United States
exemplified the discriminating application of the embargo against
States which had violated their neutrality. Thus, the withholding
of a vital commodity to the United States by the OAPEC cartel
was made in retaliation for the military commodities and diplomatic support given by the United States to a belligerent in the
conflict, -Israel. The economic coercion was, therefore, perceived
by the Arab States to be proportional to the harm suffered.
D.

Conventional International Law

1.

The Relevant Multilateral Conventions: GATT & VCOT

Probably the most significant multilateral convention governing international trade is the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT),84 to which all major non-communist nations
are parties. In fact, more than 76 nations, including Egypt and
83 Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban has emphasized that Resolution 242
called for the establishment of a permanent peace, including both the withdrawal from territory occupied in 1967 and the establishment of "secure and recognized" boundaries. He asserts that the impasse arose because the Egyptians
constantly refused to submit the boundary issue to negotiations. "If we had
been mad enough to abandon the Golan Heights and Sharm el Sheikh and all

the Sinai and the whole West Bank [of the Jordan River], would not the mas-

sive attack launched on October 6 have murdered thousands of our civilians, de-

vastated our population centers and brought us to catastrophe?
I tell you, a
massacre more hideous than Auschwitz would have been a real prospect and

Israel's survival would be in doubt."

Another Round in the War of Words,

TIME, Oct. 29, 1973, at 44.
4 Signed at Geneva on Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700,

55 U.N.T.S. 187; 4 U.S.T. 6391 (1947).
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Kuwait, are contracting parties to the convention, and Algeria,
5
Bahrain and Qatar have accepted its de facto application.
GATT was designed to insure access to international markets
s6
Howand to bar discriminatory tariffs in foreign commerce.
guarantees
which
language
contains
also
ever, the convention
access to the exports of other countries. For example, Article
XI provides:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or
other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import
or export licenses or other measures shall be instituted or maintained . . . on the exportations of any product destined for the
territory of any other contracting party.
Thus, a member nation is prohibited from imposing export
If restrictions are
restrictions except in certain circumstances.
imposed, it must do so in a manner which gives recognition to
historic trade patterns between itself and countries which it has
traditionally supplied. 7
The exceptions contained in Article XX, which permit restrictions relating to domestic programs designed to conserve exhaustible natural resources, nevertheless prohibit such restrictions when
"applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
However, Article XXI permits each conconditions prevail."
tracting party to take "any action which it considers necessary
for the protection of its essential security interests . . . taken in
time of war or other emergency in international relations."88
85 However, a number of oil-producing States have never subscribed to
GATT, including Iran, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union and Venezuela. Muir, Th'e Changing Legal Framework of International Energy Management,
9 INT'L LAW. 605, 612 (1975). Thus, not being parties to the agreement, they

are not bound by its terms, except insofar as the convention may reaffirm existing principles of customary international law.

16GATT has not, however, always been successful in securing its objectives.
87 Muir, supra note 85.
Article XIII provides that prohibitions or restrictions on exports must be administered without discrimination against third countries.
88The exceptions contained in Articles XX and XXI have been characterized by a leading authority as a "dangerous loophole to the obligations of
GATT," J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 748 (1969).
It has been argued that viewing the Arab embargo in light of the exception
contained in Article XXI(b)(iii) leads one to the conclusion that: "(1) Arab
reliance on this exception in the GATT must fail in view of the actual context
and relevant provisions of the U.N. Charter, which must be utilized as a guide to
rational, policy-serving interpretation. (2) The Arab oil cuts must be condemned
as 'arbitrary' in the sense of the purposes of the GATT and in light of the
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Thus, the agreement maintains the freedom of each party to determine the necessity of the action it takes in such extraordinary
circumstances. Moreover, Article XXXV provides for an escape
from GATT obligations for any two contracting parties which
have failed to consummate bilateral tariff negotiations. No such
negotiations have been entered into between Kuwait, the sole
Arab oil-exporting party, and any other party to the agreement. 89
Article 52 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties
(VCOT) provides that "a treaty is void if its conclusion has been
procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles
of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. "90
The Arab oil embargo was directed at noncombatant nations
at a time when the armed conflict ostensibly had been terminated. It was not implemented in order to improve materially
the Arab's military position, 91 but was instead employed as a
means to alter the relative bargaining positions of the parties in
whatever political settlement might eventuate through the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242. Thus, a treaty
establishing boundaries, refugee rights, and national security
might be concluded between the Arab States and Israel. However, the aforementioned provision of the VCOT apparently prohibits use of the oil weapon as a measure of economic coercion in
the attainment of political objectives. The difficulty lies in determining whether the economically coercive measures are applied with such intensity as to obviate freedom of choice and
constitute duress.92
unilateral character of the Arab decisions. (3) The oil cuts are 'unjustifiable'
(even if not arbitrary) in that a joint Arab committee decided upon them in
terms of the pro-Arab or anti-Arab posture of other states. (4) The oil cuts
are additionally 'unjustifiable' in terms of serving the relevant goals of the
international community as contained in the UN Charter."
Paust & Blaustein,
supra note 21, at 424.
89 Shihata, supra note 16, at 623.

90Supra note 74.
91 The embargo may have been implemented, in part, in order to discourage
Israeli annihilation of the isolated Egyptian Third Army. In what must rank
as Israel's most brilliant military feat in the nation's short but tempestuous
history, an Israeli task force of 20,000 men and 500 tanks crossed the Suez Canal
and proceeded to Adabiya and Suez cutting the highway to Cairo. It then
successfully isolated and neutralized, both politically and militarily, the Egyptian Third Army of 20,000 men and 400 tanks, which had crossed to the east
side of the Suez Canal during the early days of the Yom Kippur War. See
Brilliant Moves in a Final Battle, TIME, Nov. 5, 1973, at 44-45. See also Now for
the Bitter Battles of Peace, TIME, Nov. 12, 1973, at 57.
92Boorman, supra note 10, at 216.
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The Relevant Bilateral Treaties: FCN

The maintenance of international trade and commercial relations is one of the primary objectives of treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation (FCN) into which the United States has
entered with over 40 nations. These agreements generally accord
Most Favored Nation treatment to both exports and imports of
the contracting parties. The commitment by one party not to
discriminate prohibits a boycott against the other contracting
party unless such restriction is applied to like imports from or
exports to all other countries. 93
Four members of OAPEC (Iraq, Muscat, Oman and Saudi
Arabia) have long-standing bilateral FCN treaties with the United
States. Each has agreed to accord Most Favored Nation treatment as a measure of reciprocity with the United States. The
agreement consummated between the United States and Muscat
and Oman in 1958 provides an exception to its application vis-a-vis
measures "necessary to fulfill the obligations of a Party for the
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security,
94
The
or necessary to protect its essential security interests."
agreement concluded between the United States and Iraq in 1938
permits exceptions to its application relating to "the adoption or
enforcement of measures relating to neutrality or to rights and
obligations arising under the Covenant of the League of Nations. ' 1 It is clear from these provisions that Muscat, Oman and
Iraq only intend to be bound by the FCN agreements during
periods in which trade and commerce are a product of amicable
relations between the States concerned, and not under circumstances where the rights of neutrality and belligerency serve to
suspend normal trade relations. 96 The wording of the FCN
agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia, which
was consummated in 1933, suggests that quantitive restrictions up97
on exports are not prohibited thereby.
"

93Muir, supra note 60, at 200.
"I Treaty with Muscat and Oman and Dependencies on Amity, Economic
Relations and Consular Rights, Dec. 20, 1958, art. XI, [1960] 11 U.S.T. 1835,
T.I.A.S. No. 4530.
9"Treaty with Iraq on Commerce and Navigation, Dec. 3, 1938, art. IV,
54 Stat. 1790, T.S. No. 960, 203 L.N.T.S. 107.
% Boorman, supra note 10 at 218.
91 Provisional Agreement with Saudi Arabia on Diplomatic and Consular
Representation, Juridical Protection, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 7, 1933,
48 Stat. 1826, E.A.S. No. 53, 142 L.N.T.S. No. 329. An interpretative presumption in favor of an exception of its application on grounds of national security
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Finally, it has been argued that the combination of Articles
103 and 51 of the U.N. Charter effectively supercedes the application of Most Favored Nation provisions insofar as international
peace and security are concerned. 98

IV.
A.

U.S.

RETALIATORY ALTERNATIVES

Domestic Conservation and Alternative Energy Sources

When a Gallup Poll asked Americans: "What should the U.S.
do if Arabs impose another boycott," the largest group, 35 percent, responded by saying that the United States should attempt
to become self-sufficient. 99
During the last three decades, the world has consumed more
energy than in all of previous history. In the next 15 years, mankind is expected to consume as much energy as it has up to now.
It is anticipated that more than 70 percent of these requirements
for energy will have to be met by hydrocarbons (specifically, 16
percent by gas and 54 percent by oil).1 ° Between 1970 and 1985,
total U.S. energy consumption is projected to double from 33
million to 63 million barrels per day. The consumption of petroleum by the European Economic Community in the same period
is expected to increase by 93 percent; that of Japan by 156 percent.10' However, dwindling supplies of fossil fuels - petroleum,
natural gas and coal - and distribution problems threaten to curb
this exponential growth abruptly.
During the interim period before fossil fuels are depleted, man
faces the immediate dangers of contaminating his environment by
the intensive utilization of fossil fuels or by the imprudent and
10 2
premature deployment of new energy sources.
To many experts, "the energy crisis" was no more complicated than a recognition by the United States that it was approachinterests might well be derived from a treaty of this nature. A similar presumption may also be established on grounds of international public policy.
Accord, Schwarzenberger, 7he Most-FavoredShihata, supra note 16, at 624.

Nation Standard in British State Practice, 22

BRIT.

Y.B.

INT'L
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L. 96, 110, 111, 120

(1945).
98Boorman, supra note 10 at 218.
91At

Hand: Even

1975, at 22.
100Amuzegar,
(1973).
101
Id. at 677.

Higher Fuel Prices, U.S.
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REP.,

Feb.

3,

The Oil Story: Facts, Fiction and Fair Play, 51 FOR. AFF. 676
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ing the end of its fossil fuel reserves, with little hope of new power
103
sources for the next 15 years.
In the United States current domestic reserves are only approximately 36.8 billion barrels, including 10 billion barrels in
Alaska.104 Moreover, new finds are not keeping pace with the
rate of extraction so that total reserves have declined since 1972.
Consequently, unless adequate substitute sources of energy are
developed, the United States will be compelled to import increasing amounts of petroleum.10s
The United States is the most profligate energy consumer,
consuming one-third of the world's supply. This pattern of consumption has, in part, been attributable to the relatively low
prices heretofore paid for energy. 1 6 The extent of increased
U.S. dependence upon imported petroleum will be largely determined by its ability to conserve energy and increase domestic
energy production. Should a greater dependence on imports ensue, a future embargo would have a more severe and devasting
effect upon the U.S. economy than did the Arab oil embargo of
1973.107
The 12 OPEC nations produce 54 percent of all the oil in the
world, and hold 64 percent of the world's currently proven reserves. The proven oil reserves of exporting Arab nations are:
103One source has listed five primary energy policy objectives:
1. Assuring reliability of energy supply;
2. Achieving the lowest cost to society for energy;
3. Avoiding economic and regional inequities;
4. Safeguarding the quality of the environment; and,
5. Minimizing international problems due to energy.
ENERGY

POLICY

PROJECT

OF THE

FORD

FOUNDATION,

EXPLORING

ENERGY CHOICES

10

(1974).
104The Alaska pipeline will transport in excess of 2 million barrels of oil a
day by 1980, or one-third of current U.S. oil imports.
Projections indicate
that the North Slope of Alaska has potential reserves of as much as 80 billion
barrels. Thus, Alaskan production could eventually be between 5 and 6 million
barrels a day. Major Oil-Consuming Countries Meet at Washington to Discuss the
Energy Problem, 70 DEP'T STATE BULL. 201, 212 (1974).
Geologists also estimate that approximately 330 trillion cubic feet of natural gas
deposits could supply 5 percent of U.S. annual demand, which is currently 22
trillion cubic feet. However, such energy resources are not expected to be avail-

able earlier than 1980. The Alaska Gas Rush, TIME, Dec. 20, 1975, at 60.
105Muir, Legal and Ecological Aspects of the International Energy Situation, 8
INT'L LAW. 1, 2 (1974). See U.S. Leaning Heavier than Ever on Foreign Oil, U. S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 5, 1976, at 36.
106Major Oil-Consuming Countries Meet at Washington to Discuss the Energy
Problem, 70 DEP'T STATE BULL. 201, 210 (1974).
107NATIONAL

PETROLEUM

COUNCIL,

EMERGENCY

OF PETROLEUM IMPORTS INTO THE UNITED STATES

PREPAREDNESS

17 (1974).
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Saudi Arabia with 132 billion barrels; Kuwait with 64 billion;
Iraq with 31.5 billion; Libya with 25.5 billion; the United Arab
Emirates with 25.5 billion; and Qatar with 6.5 billion.108
Currently, the United States must import 37.4 percent of its
total consumption of petroleum, or 7 million barrels per day.109
The U.S. Department of the Interior predicts that by 1985 domestic oil-production deficits relative to projected demand will
range from 8 million barrels per day (41 percent of demand) to
as much as 16.2 million barrels per day (65 percent of demand).
A recent study undertaken by the Chase Manhattan bank predicts that by 1985 as much as 50 percent of U.S. demand will
have to be met by imports, over two-thirds of which (11.6 million
barrels per day) will have to be sought from Middle East sources.
Although recent discoveries in South America, Canada and
Alaska may enable the United States to avoid some dependency
on Arab petroleum, by 1985 declining reserve-to-production ratios
in Venezuela and increasing demand in South America and Canada may mean that only between 3.44 and 5.70 million barrels
per day of U.S. consumption can be drawn from Western Hemisphere sources. This deficit is expected to widen as domestic
demand increases and environmental pressure forces enactment of
legislation favoring low-polluting fuels.11o
To meet the enormous energy demands of the future, three alternatives present themselves: (1) To increase the supply of conventional sourc-;s (for example, coal, natural gas, crude oil and
hydroelectricity); (2) to develop more expensive substitutes (for
example, oil shale, tar sand and nuclear power); and/or (3) to
develop exotic energy potentials (for example, solar power, geothermal energy, tidal waves and hydrogen fusion)."'
Fossil fuels heretofore have been the primary source of energy
in the United States, accounting for 95 percent of total U.S.
energy consumption during 1973. Even with the most aggressive
growth in nuclear power, fossil fuels will dominate energy supply
throughout the rest of the 20th century.
Oil and gas presently represent over three-fourths of total
Natural gas is the cleanest major
U.S. energy consumption.
108 OPEC's

Oil and Money Machine: How It Works, U.S. NEWS & WORLD

REP., Oct. 28, 1974, at 38.

109
Pay More, Get Less: Oil-Gas Outlook, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 27,
1975.
110
Best, Middle East Oil and the U.S. Energy Crisis: Prospects for New Ventures in a Changed Market, 5 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 215, 246 (1973).
1I Supra note 100, at 677.
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energy source; oil is the most versatile. However, oil and gas
may well be our scarcest energy sources over the long term. n2
The United States holds prodigious reserves of coal. In fact,
one-third of the world's known deposits are located in the United
States. As much as 437 billion tons of coal are presently recoverable under existing methods of extraction - a volume equal to a
3
40-year supply of energy. Annual coal production in the United
States rose from 592 million tons in 1973 to an all time high of
640 million tons last year. President Ford called for a doubling of
coal output by 1985.
Recent estimates indicate that the United States holds 3.2
trillion tons of coal.1i4 However, ecological opposition to largescale utilization of our vast deposits of coal might be severe." 5 Coal
is the worst polluter of the energy sources. Its smoke contains
sulphur compounds which, when mixed with water vapor in the
air, becomes an acid which decomposes stone and metal, not to
mention human lungs. Moreover, enormous deposits require surface mining for economically feasible extraction." 6 Increases in
the supply of coal and hydroelectricity are costly, time-consuming
and replete with significant technological limitations.
Exotic
energy source potentials are expected to remain marginal because
of enormous technological complexities and high costs." 7 The
112 ENERGY

POLICY

PROJECT

OF THE FORD

FOUNDATION,

A

TIME TO CHOOSE

181

(1974).
King Coal's Return: Wealth and Worry, TIME, Mar. 1, 1976, at 45.
of oil will satisfy the energy requirements
of the United States for 12 years, gas for 12 years, and, amazingly, coal for 500
years. U. S. Proven Energy Reserves, TIME, Feb. 9, 1976, at 15.
115 Ecological opposition to expansive utilization of atomic energy resources is
also increasing. See Atomic Power Why the Dream Gets Dimmer By the Day,
U. S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 16, 1976, at 49.
116 Muir, supra note 105, at 5.
See Energy Crisis in America, CONG. QUARTERLY
27-37 (1973).
117 Amuzegar, supra note 100, at 677.
In addition to the conventional sources such as oil, gas and coal, the United
States will require the development of new sources of energy including solar,
geothermal and nuclear fusion. For an analysis of the availability of capital to
finance the development of energy sources, see Joint Hearings on the Capability of
U.S. Financial Markets to Capitalize Energy Projects Required for the United States
to Move Toward Energy Independence Before two Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See Alternatives to Oil, TIME, Dec. 10, 1973,
at 43, and Shift to Shale, TIME, Dec. 10, 1973, at 44.
Oil shale is one of the nation's most abundant energy sources, with oil in
high-grade shale estimated to be the equivalent of the present levels of U. S. oil
consumption for a century. However, the environmental problems in obtaining
it with present technology are more difficult and far-reaching than those for coal.
ENERGY POLICY PROJECT OF THE FORD FOUNDATION, A TIME TO CHOOSE 182 (1974).
113

114This nation's proven, reserves
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rapid expansion of alternative energy sources is restrained, in
the short term, by human and environmental considerations. 118
Certainly, programs of conservation of domestic petroleum
and diminished consumption must be employed. 119 Tariffs on
imported oil may be increased; price controls on domestic oil may
be removed; gasoline rationing may be imposed;12° tax incentives21
for domestic production and exploration may be employed.1
The Ford Administration attempted to decrease the amount of
petroleum imported from abroad by 1 million barrels per day by
the end of 1975, and 2 million barrels per day by the end of 1977.122
Nevertheless, one source has indicated that consumption would
have to be decreased to such an extent that half of U.S. industry
would be without fuel and half of the U.S. work force would be
118Id.

at 158.

See Farmanfarmaian,
119

World Afford OPEC Oil? 53

Gutowski, Okita, Roosa & Wilson,
FOR.

How Can the

AnF. 201 (1975).

120 Strict motor gasoline rationing suggests itself as a way to accclerate and
increase energy savings in the transportation sector. Regulations could also be
promulgated to alter the product/yield ratios for domestic refineries in order to
maximize heating oil production. B. COOPER, AN ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS OF
THE ENERGY EMERGENCY 16 (1973).
121 During the Arab oil embargo, in an attempt to counteract the impending
energy crisis, the Administration on November 26, 1973, announced a number
of actions designed to curtail the demand for petroleum products. These actions
were taken pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, and the Defense
Production Act of 1950. They consisted of allocation reduction to various end
users. The National Energy Act of 1973 provided additional use restrictions in
an effort to conserve existing petroleum supplies. Id. at 11-12.
It was also suggested that the additional measures of (a) strict motor gasoline
rationing, and (b) regulations altering the product/yield ratios of domestic
refineries in order to maximize heating oil production, should be implemented.
Id. at 16.
In November of 1973, President Nixon inaugurated Project Independence,
which was designed to insure an expansion in domestic energy production so
that the United States would no longer be subject to economic disruption, or
the threat of disruption, from a sudden curtailment of vital energy supplies.
The Project was designed (a) to conserve energy by establishing a new energy
ethic designed to reduce demand, (b) to increase production of all forms of energy
in the United States, and (c) to meet the energy requirements of the United
States at the lowest cost consistent with the protection of both national security
Major Oil-Consuming Countries Meet at lWIashiugton to 1)iscuss
and environment.
theEnergy Problem, 70 DEP'T STATE BULL. 201, 210 (1974).
The U. S. goal is to reduce its annual growth rate
122 Supra note 109, at 35.
in energy consumption from the present 4 to 5 percent to 2 or 3 percent by 1980.
If this can be accomplished, approximately 7 million barrels of oil per day
could be saved.
For an analysis of the mandatory oil import programs instituted by the United
States, see Note, The Mandatory Oil Import Program: A Review oj Present Regulations
and Proposalsfor Change in the 1970's, 7 TEX. INT'L L. J. 373 (1972).
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unemployed before U.S. demand would be diminished to an
123
extent that would compel OPEC to cut prices.
The Federal Government has not been lethargic in responding
to the energy crisis. Indeed, it has displayed an acute awareness
of the complexity of the problem, as well as enormous vitality
in an attempt to develop an effective policy designed to find a
solution to the energy requirements of this nation. For example,
during the Arab oil embargo, Congress provided the President
with discretionary powers to implement a temporary program of
emergency petroleum allocation to deal with shortages of crude oil,
residual fuel oil, and refined petroleum products, or dislocations
in their national distribution system. 124
Congress has subsequently responded to the impending energy
crisis by creating the Federal Energy Administration (FEA).
Its purpose is to assure a coordinated and effective approach to
overcoming energy shortages. FEA is specifically designed to:
(a) Develop effective programs of conservation of scarce energy
supplies, (b) insure fair and efficient distribution of such supplies,
(c) maintain fair and reasonable consumer prices for such supplies, (d) promote the expansion of readily available energy
sources, and (e) assist in the development of policies and plans
to meet the energy requirements of the United States. ' 2
The Energy Research and Development Administration and
Nuclear Regulatory Commission were created in 1974 to plan,
coordinate, support and manage the research and development of
energy sources. 26 Congress has recognized that "the urgency of
123 Ignotus,

Seizing Arab Oil, HARPER'S, Feb. 1975, at 48.
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. % 751 to 756
(1973).
See Cockrell, Federal Regulation of Energy: The Exceptions Process, 7
TRANSPORTATION L.J. 83 (1975).
For a critical analysis of contemporary domestic
restrictions on the importation of oil, see National Security and Oil Import Regulation: The License Fee Approach, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 399 (1975).
125 Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. % 761 to 786
(1974).
Congress has not been unmindful of the environmental considerations.
See Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act o3 1974, 15 U.S.C.
§ 791 to 798 (1974).
126Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. % 5801 to 5891 (1974).
ERDA absorbed and abolished the preexisting Atomic Energy Commission.
See 42 U.S.C. § 5814 (1974).
It has been asserted that, despite these efforts
undertaken by Federal agencies, the United States continues to import 17 billion
barrels of oil per day, 25.5 percent of which comes from the Middle East. See
Mirvahabi, supra note 8, at 109. See also Best, Middle East Oil and the U.S. Energy
Crisis - Prospects for New Ventures in a Changed Market, 5 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
247 (1973).
Nevertheless, the United States reduced its total energy consumption in
1975 by approximately 2.5 percent since 1974, and 4.8 percent since 1973. U.S.
124
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the Nation's energy challenge will require commitments similar
to those undertaken in the Manhattan and Apollo projects,"127
in an attempt to formulate a comprehensive and aggressive
research and development program designed to increase the availability of domestic energy reserves (for example, fossil fuels, nuclear fuels, geothermal resources and solar energy).128 More recently, legislation was promulgated extending Presidential powers
to impose mandatory rationing in times of emergency, and
authorizing a massive stock-piling of petroleum to avert the full
impact of any future oil embargo.1 29 Certainly an emergency
stockpile of oil must be set aside at a rate commensurate with
the level of imports from insecure sources.
B.

Diplomatic and Political Remedies

Despite the enthusiastic and determined efforts of the State
Department, diplomacy has failed to bring down the high price of
oil. It is unlikely that mere verbal persuasion would induce Arab
leaders to end a future embargo of petroleum unless, of course, the
Israelis were diplomatically persuaded to grant territorial concessions to the Palestinians. Nevertheless, the determined application of direct and indirect diplomatic pressure would and should
be a condition precedent to the use of force.
Several Arab oil-producing States have warned that the United
States cannot be assured of obtaining uninterrupted supplies of oil
unless it modifies its pro-Israeli foreign policy. Because of the
increasing reliance of the United States upon imported oil, many
American foreign policy experts believe that this Arab threat is
credible. They suggest that the goal of "improving U.S. oil security" justifies reversing present Middle East policy to lend more
positive support to Arab interests. t ° Moreover, it has been suggested that it might become necessary to withdraw U.S. diplomatic and military support to Israel as the political price for
growing quantities of secure oil. Inasmuch as other, less drastic
oil consumption decreased 155 million barrels in 1975.

These reductions have

been attributed to: (a) The nation's economic slump, (b) higher fuel prices, (c)
energy conservation efforts, and (d) relatively mild winters. Benjamin, Energy
Use Cut 2.5% in '75, Wash. Post, Apr. 5, 1976, at A-5, col. 1.
127 42 U.S.C. § 5901 (b) (1974).
12 See Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C.

§

5901 to 5915 (1974).
129See

Energy: What New Law Does to Fuel Prices and Supplies, U.S.

& WORLD REP., Jan. 5, 1976, at 32.
130 See Blackmail by Oil, THE NEW

REPUBLIC,

Oct. 20, 1973, at 8.
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options exist, the American people will presumably be unwilling
131
to pay such a drastic price for additional oil.
The United States could withdraw its military mission from
Saudi Arabia; but, no doubt, the French would be delighted to
send a military mission as a replacement.
The United States
could also refuse to sell military material to Arab States, were
other sources not readily available.
Some U.S. and European businessmen and politicians have
suggested that an effort should be made to have the United Nations declare Arab oil an "international resource," which would
be open to all investors under U.N. supervision. Because the
composition of the General Assembly is heavily weighted against
industrialized nations, such a resolution would never receive a
majority of votes.
Another alternative might be a unilateral special arrangement
with one or more oil-exporting nations (for example, Saudi Arabia
and/or Iran).
In return for technical and military assistance
and preferential treatment for other exports, the United States
might acquire long-term commitments for specified quantities of
oil. 132 The oil-producing States are acutely aware that their
economies are based upon a wasting asset, and that unless they
acquire an alternate base for their economies within the next
few decades, they may lose their single opportunity to achieve
economic prosperity and development.
It is precisely in the
fields of economic planning, science and technology and industrial
development, that the consuming nations can provide something
1
to the producing nations which the latter desperately need. 33
However, even if such agreements could be reached, they
would represent a major departure by the United States from the
principle of multilaterlism in international economic relations.
Other oil-importing nations could be expected to seek similar
agreements, conceivably creating severe competition among
Western industrialized nations and straining relations among allies. The United States might also find itself deeply committed
to the survival of the specific governments with whom the agreements are signed. Moreover, no agreement can guarantee prevention of an embargo if there is an impasse in the Arab-Israeli
131
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settlement and the United States continues to support the Israeli position. 134
The oil strategy announced by Secretary of State Kissinger
in 1974 included: (a) Immediate reduction in oil consumption
by the United States and other industrial nations in order to
lower the cost of imported petroleum, (b) coordinated measures
to develop alternate sources of oil and other fuels over the next
decade, 135 and (c) the joint establishment of a $25 billion loan
and guarantee fund by major nations to provide secondary financing for the industrial nations' $40 billion annual oil payment
deficit.
In fact, 16 nations, including the United States, have become
members of the recently created International Energy Agency
(lEA). lEA, the West's counterpart to OAPEC, will cooperate
closely with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
LEA members have already agreed
Development (OECD).
oil supplies should a future embargo
sharing
of
upon a system
36
be instituted.1
On March 20, 1975, the United States agreed in principle
131, at 169.
oil importation, and rapidly increasing the expansion of nuclear
power, raises another energy-related foreign policy concern - the proliferation
of nuclear weapons. The commercial application of nuclear power in the production of electricity is on the verge of rapid expansion throughout the world. In
1973, 67 nuclear power plants were operating outside the United States in 29
different countries. In essence, the problem is that relatively few technological
impediments exist to prohibit a government from taking nuclear material from a
civilian nuclear program and manufacturing crude nuclear weapons.
A prudent effort to reduce the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and
the concomitant threat to the existence of humanity, is for nuclear-exporting
nations to achieve agreement in limiting exportation of nuclear reactor and
uranium enrichment materials. As a part of such an agreement, the nuclear
exporters could then provide Third and Fourth World nations with technical
and financial assistance so that they can develop more economical, domestic
reserves (for example, solar, hydroelectric, organic wastes and geothermal).
The risk of nuclear annihilation increases in a world where energy requirements escalate at an enormous rate. Thus, the reductioit of the nuclear weapons
proliferation risk, which increases inexorably with the expansion of nuclear
power, should be an urgent priority of U. S. diplomacy. Supra note 131, at 171.
1America's Floundering Oil Policy, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 23, 1974, at 80. See
.Atgreement on an International Energy Program, Paris, Nov. 18, 1974, 14 INT'L LEGAL
Should a shortage of 7 percent affect all of the parties, they
MATS. 1 (1975).
are committed to reducing their demand by 7 percent. Should the shortage
reach 12 percent, the parties are required to reduce demand by 10 percent and,
if deemed necessary, to utilize reserve supplies and share all petroleum in their
possession, including imports and domestic supplies. Allocations would be made
by the quasi-independent industry advisory body within the International Energy
Agency. Supra note 133, at 612.
134Supra note
135 Limiting
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with the other 17 lEA members to the establishment of a common
floor price on oil imports. The proposed minimum import price
was designed to protect domestic energy investments from becoming noncompetitive should world oil prices drop, and forms a
primary part of the Administration's effort to strengthen consumer solidarity in dealing with OPEC. 137
In order to cope with the short-range dangers of a new embargo
and oil-related, balance-of-payments problems, the lEA has created a plan for mutual assistance in the event of an embargo,
involving emergency oil supplies, reduced consumption, and oil
sharing.138
A primary goal of U.S. diplomacy over the past 2 years has
been to disunite OPEC. The United States has attempted to
weld consuming nations into a bloc which would reduce oil
imports and accelerate development of alternative sources of
energy, 139 with the intention of reducing OPEC revenues to a
137The President of the United States currently holds broad powers under
the national security provisions (section 232) of the Trade Expansion Act of

1962 to adjust import barriers for the protection of the domestic energy industry.
These powers, however, were not intended to be utilized to maintain a price
floor for the purpose of stimulating domestic investment. The Ford Administration, therefore, requested authority to establish a floor price in its proposed
Energy Independence Act of 1975 (Title IX).
The United States proposed a minimum import price and a program of
common investment incentives for high-cost synthetic fuel development and of
joint research and development in more exotic fuel technologies, in an effort to
accelerate the development of additional domestic energy supplies in IEA countries. The minimum import price was designed to protect investment in the bulk
of conventional nuclear and fossil (gas, oil, coal) energy sources from future
competition of low-cost foreign oil imports. It was not designed to be high
enough to protect costly alternative energy sources (for example, shale oil, coal
gasification). The floor price could be' maintained by tariff, quota, or variable
levy, depending upon the preference of each individual participant.
The Subcommittee on International Economics of the Joint Economic
Committee rejected the Administration's proposal, concluding that a minimum
price for oil imports is not an appropriate method of protecting domestic
investments in conventional energy resources from becoming noncompetitive
should world oil prices drop, inasmuch as: (a) Existing investment incentives
are sufficient to achieve desired ends; (b) direct subsidization of energy investment would be more economical and equitable than a floor price; (c) the floor
price is a clumsy tool for curbing consumption; and (d) the floor price is unnecessary to insure the United States against competitive disadvantage. See
SUBCOMM. ON INT'L ECON., JOINT ECON. Comm., THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S OIL
FLOOR

PRICE PROPOSAL:

(1975). •
138Katz,
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94th Cong., 2d Sess.

Department Discusses International Economic Policy, 43

DEP'T
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BULL. 707, 710 (1975).
139 The United States has entered into a number of both bilateral and multilateral agreements with other nations for the collective research and develop-
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point which would compel some of its 13 member nations to slash
prices, thus dissolving the cartel. But the attempt has been unsuccessful, and the policy is now being quietly abandoned.
The softening U.S. attitude is attributable to several factors.
First, predictions that a massive transfer of wealth to the oil-

producing States would cripple the industrial world's financial
Lush
and production systems have proven to be unfounded.
export markets have been created in OPEC nations for U.S.,
Japanese and European goods. Much of the rise in oil prices
has already been absorbed by consuming nations. According to a
recent study by the Brookings Institute, even with higher oil
prices, the growth of disposable income in the developed world
will be reduced by only three percent between now and 1980.
Second, the Administration has been unable to rally Europeans and Japanese to its anti-OPEC strategy. These nations
are far more dependent upon imported oil than is the United
States and are exceedingly reluctant to annoy the producing
States. t4° France has even refused to join the lEA, which the

United States had hoped would unite consuming nations in a
struggle against OPEC pricing policies. Great Britain, which is
optimistic about North Sea oil, is hopeful that high crude prices
ment of alternative energy sources and more efficient utilization of existing
sources. A U. S. objective in confronting the energy crisis is adequacy of domestic
energy supplies - in effect, energy independence.
For a list and description of current U.S. cooperative programs in energy
research and development, see Pollack & Congdon, International Cooperation in
Energy Research and Development, 6 L & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 677 (1974).
140 Faced with the major "supply
shock" of Oct. 1973 and the overall
reduction in Arab oil production, the immediate reaction of practically every
major importing nation was to engage in a competitive scramble for petroleum
supplies, coupled with offers to adapt its Middle East policy to satisfy Arab
demands. Levy, World Oil Cooperation or International Chaos, 52 FoR. AFF. 690,
696 (1974).
For example, the European Economic Community (EEC), whose ultimate
goal is eventual political unification, was unable during the Arab oil embargo to
retain even a vestige of economic unification with respect to its most essential
imported commodity - petroleum. Instead, each of the EEC members initiated
an independent diplomatic effort to achieve bilateral agreement with various
oil-exporting Arab States and thereby guarantee continued supplies. The
panic which swept the EEC may perhaps be attributable to two factors. First,
Europe is more heavily dependent upon imported oil than are most regions of
the world; in fact, of the enormous quantities of petroleum imported by European nations, 73 percent is imported from Middle East sources. Second, inasmuch as The Netherlands, an EEC member, was singled out by OAPEC
for particularly stringent treatment, its neighboring States may have decided
that disassociation therefrom might inhibit the wrath of Arab scorn which would
have otherwise arisen by a process of osmosis.
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will continue. Non-OPEC producers such as Mexico and Canada
have also benefited from the enormous cost of oil.
Third, OPEC has proved remarkably resilient because its
members are well aware that their power to control prices lies
in their ability to maintain a united front. Thus, cartel members
141
have been able to restrain traditional animosities.
Instead of confrontation, the United States is now seeking to
influence OPEC through accommodation with Saudi Arabia the cartel's most influential member and largest producer of
petroleum.
The Saudis' ardent anti-communism, their support
of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat against more radical Arab
leaders, and their relatively moderate position on oil pricing make
1
them particularly acceptable to U.S. policymakers. 42
In the fall of 1975, the strategy proved to be successful, when
the Saudis held the OPEC price increase to 10 percent, although
However, whether
some cartel members wanted much more.
OPEC will continue to present even a faqade of moderation reIranian Interior Minister Jamshid
mains open to question.
Amouzegar noted recently that with the expected worldwide
economic recovery, new oil price increases "will become possible again by mid-1976."143
Perhaps the most effective political strategy that the United
States could adopt is also the most constructive - continuing
its efforts as a broker to guarantee a peaceful settlement between
the Arabs and Israelis.
C.

Economic Reprisals

Arab governments have concentrated the bulk of their investOf the
ment capital in the short-term Eurocurrency market.
$60 billion accumulated by OPEC in 1974, only 1.7 percent or
approximately $1 billion was placed in U.S. stocks and other
assets, approximately 6.7 percent or $4 billion was invested in
U.S. bank deposits, and 10 percent or $6 billion was placed in
141Iran and

Iraq have settled a long standing border dispute, and radical

Algeria agreed with Saudi Arabia's moderate pricing policies when the Saudis
Living with OPEC, TIME, Jan. 19,
presented Algeria with a generous loan.
1976, at 54.
142Despite its enormous wealth, Saudi Arabia is still essentially a feudal
State badly in need of agricultural and industrial development. Within the past
year, the United States has signed agreements to provide Saudi Arabia with
military and technical assistance, including electrification projects and agricultural development programs. Id.
143 Id.

1977]

ECONOMIC AGGRESSION

U.S. government securities. The largest amount, 35 percent or
$21 billion, was invested in the Eurocurrency market, and an additional 12.5 percent or $7.5 billion was invested in U.K. deposits
and government securities. The remaining capital was loaned to
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and to other
developed and developing nations.'" During 1974, $11 billion of
both short- and long-term investments were placed by OPEC
nations in the United States, and less than $1 billion of this
total represented foreign direct investment. 145
During the first
10 months of 1975, OPEC members invested $5.2 billion in the
United States. 146 Most of this capital has been placed in shortterm and highly liquid portfolio investments, although some
petrocapital, including a $10 million investment in an Atlanta hotel
and shopping complex, and the purchase of an entire island off
the coast of South Carolina, has been placed in long-term direct
investments. 147
The traditional economic policy of the United States has been
to minimize barriers for investment and to encourage the unrestrained international movement of goods and capital. Thus,
for example, the United States was instrumental in the development of the Code of Liberalization of Capital Movement by the
members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). Moreover, the United States is presently
engaged in the formulation within the OECD of consultative
agreements regarding departures from national treatment of
foreign investors or the institution of incentives or disincentives
for foreign investment.
Additionally, the U.S. commitment to
non-restrictive treatment of foreign investment is embodied in an

144 Hearings on 5.425 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 83-84 (1975).
145 Id. at 35.
146 Finance Trends, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Dec. 22, 1974, at 74. The
U. S. Treasury Department estimates that OPEC nations will have surplus
"investable" revenues of approximately $45 billion during 1976. This compares
with $41.6 billion for 1975 and $59.3 billion for 1974. The United States is expected to receive about 15 to 16 percent of the $41.8 billion which OPEC nations
invest abroad this year. OPEC Oil Profits Expected To Go For Increased hnports,
Wash. Post, Jan. 19, 1976, at D-11, col. 7.
17 Dempsey, Legal and Economic Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment in the
Southeastern United States, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'' L. 247, 289 (1976). See Wilner,
Dempsey & Smith, Planning a System of Incentive and Regulatory Legislation
with Respect to Foreign Investment and Trade in Georgia 1975 (unpublished
study of the Georgia Institute of Government).
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extensive network of friendship, commerce and navigation
treaties.14
The policy of the United States is to admit and treat foreign
capital investments on a basis of equality or parity with domestic
capital. Restrictions at the Federal level apply to specific categories of enterprises having national security significance, or
involving the exploitation of certain natural resources, or in which
particular fiduciary relationships are involved.49
Existing federal statutes and regulations are generally receptive
to foreign investment, prohibiting acquisitions in only a few inCongress has redustries and under a few circumstances.150
are engaged in
which
enterprises
of
ownership
stricted foreign
certain exempted activities, such as domestic radio communications,151 coastal or inland shipping,152 and the production of
atomic energy. 153 Federal legislation also requires that firms
s
15 4
mining on Federal lands,15
engaged in air transportation,
and the development of hydroelectric power on navigable
streams 156 be organized and chartered under United States law,
but has not prohibited foreign control of such companies. Neither
foreign nor domestic investors are required to seek governmental
permission to engage in U.S. business transactions, except in
those fields of special regulation and supervision, such as in57
surance, public utilities and banking.
With the massive transfer of wealth from Western industrialized nations to petroleum exporting countries, and, in turn, the
investment by the latter of petrocapital into the former, a protectionist paranoia emerged in the United States. To a number
of Western financiers, the huge cash surpluses accumulated by
Arab oil-producing States is analogous to a Khanjar (Arab dagger)
By
poised at the jugular of international monetary stability.
148See Walker,

Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Invest-

ment: Present U. S. Practice, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 229 (1956).
149Supra note 144, at 84-85.
150For a detailed evaluation of such legislation, see Elmer & Johnson, Legal
Obstacles to Foreign Acquisitions of U.S. Corporations, 30 Bus. LAW. 681, 683
(1975).
151 47 U.S.C. § 310 (1970).
152 46 U.S.C. § 883 (1970).
2133 (1970).
153 42 U.S.C.
15449

U.S.C.

§ 1378, 1401, 1508 (1970).

15530 U.S.C. §§ 22, 24, 71, 181, 352 (1970).
156 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1970).
157Supra note 144, at 85.
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shifting their funds from one currency to another, the oil sheiks
158
could precipitate an unending round of monetary crises.
The United States could conceivably attempt to freeze Arab
oil investments in this nation. Approximately half of the capital
Saudia Arabia and Kuwait have deposited is held by U.S. banks.
But much of that is held by European branches of American
financial institutions - and European States may be unwilling
to permit their branches of U.S. banks to freeze Arab funds.
Moreover, unless the expropriation of Arab capital were accomplished almost instantaneously, the Arabs could sell their
threatened dollars for gold or other currencies, destroying the
strength of the dollar which has only recently begun to recover
from two devaluations and a long seige of selling.
Numerous legislative proposals have been introduced on the
floors of Congress which have been designed to prohibit, curb or
regulate foreign investment (both direct and portfolio) in the
United States. For example, Senator Harrison Williams, Jr.,
(D-N.J.) introduced the Foreign Investment Act of 1975 which
proposed to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 so as to
require notification by foreign investors of proposed acquisitions
of equity securities of U.S. companies, and to authorize the
President to prohibit such acquisitions as he deemed appropriate
for purposes of national security, foreign policy or domestic economy. 5 9 Probably the most extreme legislative proposal was the
Dent-Gaydos bill, which would have amended the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 "to restrict persons who are not citizens
of the United States from acquiring more than 35 per centum of
the voting securities or more than 5 per centum of the voting
securities of any issuer whose securities are registered under such
Act. "160
It is fortunate that such extreme measures were rejected.
Prohibitions or severe restrictions upon foreign investment in the
United States might well make the dollar less attractive relative
to other currencies, and thus contribute to its decline in value.
A nationalistic approach to foreign investment could also provoke
similar retaliation against U.S. investment abroad which involves
a far greater commitment of capital than does foreign investment
158Arab

Caution, TIME, Dec. 24, 1974, at 78.

159 S. 425, 94th

Cong.,

1st Sess. (1975); see supra note 135.

See Robinson,

Department Discusses Foreign Policy Aspects of the Foreign Investment Act of 1975,
72 DEP'T STATE BULL. 378, 379-380 (1975).
160 H.R. 8951, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973);
(1974).

H.R. 11265, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
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in the United States. Finally, a need exists to encourage an
inflow of foreign capital, not only to balance the outflow of dollars
spent for petroleum imports, but also to provide funds for U.S.
domestic capital markets.161
When polled, the second largest group of Americans having
an opinion, 24 percent, believed that the United States should
retaliate with economic sanctions if Arab nations impose another
oil boycott.162 The United States could charge sharply higher
prices for all goods and services (including the massive quantities
of military hardware purchased by Arab States) sold to oil producers. Alternatively, the United States could impose an economic boycott against Persian Gulf States, refusing to sell armaments, industrial equipment, food and other commodities to Arab
nations. 163 The financial institutions of industrial nations could
refuse to accept OPEC deposits unless they are long term, evenly
distributed, and at low interest - or possibly under any circumstances.
Conceivably, the transfer of real assets could be
prohibited, and OPEC money could thus be forced to remain
164
paper money.

Such methods would, however, prove totally ineffective unless
the United States could persuade its European allies to participate.
A concerted Western boycott on manufactured products would
injure the Arabs, but Western economies more desperately require oil than the pre-industrial Arab States require modern
manufactures. With respect to the utilization of food as an economic weapon in retaliation to the OAPEC embargo of petroleum, former Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz indicated:
161 See Petrodollars Are Dollars, NAT'L REV., Apr. 11, 1975, at 384.
The United
States has encountered a balance-of-payments deficit for 23 of the past 24 years.
See McDermott, Foreign Direct Investment Controls, 11 HARV. INT'L L. J. 490, 499
(1972).
For an examination of the legislation introduced during the 93d and
94th Congresses, see Note, U.S. Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment: Current
Developments and the Congressional Response, 15 VA. J. INT't L. 611 (1975); see
Dempsey, Primary Tax Incentives for Industrial Investment in the Southeastern United
States, 25 EMORY L.J. 789 (1976); see also Note, Evaluation of the Need for Further
Statutory Controls on Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 8 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L.
187 (1974); Dempsey, Legal and Economic Incentives for Foreign
Direct Investment in the Southeastern United States, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 247,
255-56 (1976).
162At Hand: Even Higher Fuel Prices, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 3,
1975, at 22.
163Ford's Warning to the Arabs Will it Bring Down Oil Prices? U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Oct. 7, 1974, at 41.
164Supra note 123, at 48.
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The Arab oil embargo of 1973-74 was imposed on the United
States and on Europe for the obvious purpose of eroding support
for Israel. To some extent it did achieve that purpose.
At that time it was suggested that we shut off our shipments
of food to the Arab nations in retaliation. But while we ship
food to the Arabs, they are not that dependent on us. If we
had shut off food to them at that time, they would have easily
replaced our shipments from other sources. 65
A U.S. refusal to sell armaments to Saudi Arabia will be
meaningless if France and Sweden are willing to sell. The refusal of New York bankers to accept short-term deposits of petrodollars will be futile if Swiss bankers readily accept such deposits.
Would not South Africa sell its gold to Arabs willing to invest
dollars, marks and yen? Could the Japanese, who are totally
dependent upon imported oil, refuse Arab demands, however
outrageous, without facing economic disaster? Would not Communist nations be willing to sell their wares to the Arabs? Even
in participating States, would not black market transfers of goods
and services be enormous?
Professors McDougal and Feliciano have indicated that:
Reprisals may be defined as violent measures which would
otherwise be unlawful, invoked as a response to and a sanction
against the prior unlawful violence of the enemy. The world
public order recognizes the legality of reprisals as a last desperate measure to secure law-conforming behavior. The original effort of such order is to prevent change by violent means;
when that effort fails, recourse is had to the laws of war to
minimize unnecessary destruction of values; when observance
of the law of war breaks down, the only immediate recourse of
the injured is to reprisals in the hope that the enemy will recognize the desirability of returning to observance of that law.166
A number of legal scholars do not believe that reprisals fall
within the ambit of legitimate self-defense under Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter. 167 However, there are authorities who take a contrary position. For example, Yoran Dinstein has asserted:
International law is created and determined by the practice
of States - not by lawyers, regardless of their erudition and
expertise, or by the misguided resolutions of nonlegislative
165 Food:

Potent U.S. Weapon, U.S.

NEWS
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REP., Feb. 16, 1976,

at 26.
16 McDougal & Feliciano, International Coercion and World Public Order: The
General Principles of the Law of War, 67 YALE L.J. 771, 883 (1958).
167 See

281 (1963).
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bodies. Efforts to institute textbook tenets of international
law, confusing the lex lata with the lex ferenda and widely ignored
by States, only serve to perpetuate the layman's belief that the
international legal system is a chimerical notion.
Even in terms of sheer rationality, since war, the ultimate
weapon, is generally accepted as a legitimate form of selfdefense (in response to an armed attack), it is incomprehensible
that the use of a lesser weapon, a part rather than the whole,
should be regarded as objectionable. If war is a permissible
form of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter, a
fortiori measures short of war, or more specifically, reprisals,
are also permissible.16

8

just as a legitimate claim of self-defense may justify unilateral measures involving the use of force which would otherwise
be illegal under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, a State may
justify unilateral economic measures which might otherwise be
illegal if it can demonstrate that such measures are taken in selfCertainly, the requirements of self-defense must be
defense.
proved. The State would have to demonstrate that it was reacting to a wrongful action of another State, posing an immediate
danger to its independence or security in a situation affording
no alternative means of protection, and that the reaction was
9
proportionate to the harm threatened.16
in contrast to self-defense, reprisals are punitive in character
they seek to impose reparation for the harm done, or to compel a satisfactory settlement of the dispute created by the initial
illegal act, or to compel the delinquent State to abide by law in
the future. Because such action is taken after the event and when
the harm has already been inflicted, reprisals cannot be characterized as a means of protection. 170 Because States will usually
justify their activity as lawful per se or justifiable self-defense,
economic measures which are openly admitted to be retaliatory
are rare.171 The legal control of economic reprisals must be accomplished in terms of the accepted preconditions for reprisals,
which are:
1. A prior international delinquency against the claimant
State. (This would exclude reprisals against economic measures not in themselves unlawful).
168Dinstein, The Legal Issues of "Para-War" and Peace in the Middle East,
44 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 466, 472 (1970).
169Bowett, Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States, 13 VA. J. INT'L L.

1,

7 (1972).
170Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L.
1, 3 (1972).
171Supra note 169, at 8.
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2. Redress by other means must be either exhausted or
unavailable.
3. The economic measures taken must be limited to the
necessities of the case and proportionate to the wrong done.172
Surreptitious Internal Involvement

D.

No international covenant prohibits clandestine intelligence
operations, and today over 40 nations are actively engaged in
surreptitious activities. 173 Former CIA Director William Colby
has emphasized the ability of covert operations to solve a problem at an early stage before it develops into a severe international crisis. 174 Nevertheless, various forms of U.S. intelligence
operations may have been effectively precluded by a combination
of Congressional investigations and press leaks.
Such investigatory activity may ultimately result in the promulgation of severe
legislative restrictions upon many of the clandestine activities of
U.S. intelligence agencies.
There is no question but that an
American instigation of a coup d'etat would be a highly illegal
interference in the internal affairs of a foreign State. Nevertheless, considering the possibilities for nuclear war arising out of a
Super Power confrontation, it might be argued that a covert
operation designed to bring a leader to power in an Arab State
who would be willing to end a future oil embargo would be the
lesser of the two evils.
E.

Military Intervention: The Last Resort

1.

Invasion and Occupation

One retaliatory alternative available to the United States,
should the Arabs again impose an embargo upon the exportation
of petroleum, would be the military invasion and occupation of
Arab oilfields.
The United States could easily defeat Arab
armies and, although the Arabs could probably sabotage the wells,
the technology of oil production in the desert is so simple that
the United States could induce a resumption in production in a
minimal amount of time. Such an option would, however, appear abhorrent to a nation dedicated to principles of world peace.
Moreover, a risk of war with the Soviet Union and the inherent
172Id.

at 9-10.

173McCone,

Why

We Need the CIA, Wash. Star, Jan. 20, 1976, at A-16,

col. 3.
174Compare It's Maddening and Frustrating, TLME, Jan. 19, 1976, at 16;. with
Can George Bush Save the CIA? U. S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 9, 1976, at 19.
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vulnerability of oil fields to guerrilla sabotage are omnipresent
obstacles in the military path.
President Ford, in a speech before the World Energy Conference held in Detroit, asserted:
Throughout history, nations have gone to war over natural
advantages such as water or food, or convenient passages on
land and sea. But in the nuclear age, when any local conflict
may escalate to global catastrophe, war brings unacceptable
risks for all mankind . . .
We recognize the desires of the producers to earn a fair
share or a fair price for their oil as a means of helping to deBut exorbitant prices can only
velop their own economies.
distort the world economy, run the risk of a worldwide depression and threaten the breakdown of world order and world

safety. 17s

A number of Washington officials have suggested that the

United States could eventually be forced to choose between economic ruin and armed intervention. 176 Should the energy crisis
evolve into an international disaster, the possibility of a U.S. mil-

itary seizure of Arab oilfields cannot be discounted.

Already,

one of the nation's leading "think tanks" has initiated a comprehensive study of America's military options in responding to the
oil crisis.

177

Warning to the Arabs - Will it Bring Down Oil Prices?, U.S. NEWS
Oct. 7, 1974, at 42.
Nationally syndicated columnist Jack Anderson reported on November 8
176
that, on the basis of information from "important policy makers . . . a grim new
mood is developing in Washington that military intervention may be necessary
to bring down the price of oil and save the West from economic ruin." A toplevel policy maker recently asserted, "We are determined to avoid provocative
threats. But we want the Arabs to understand that we are not ruling out the
Another obuse of American military power if the situation requires it."
server commented, "The Arabs must be made to realize that 800 million people
in America, Europe and Japan are not going to permit their industrial societies
Will'U.S. Seize Mideast Oil?, U.S.
to be destroyed by 80 million Arabs."
175Ford's

&

WORLD REP.,

NEWS & WORLD REP.,

Dec. 2, 1974, at 18.

A U.S. defense consultant has laid down an entire blueprint for
the invasion of Saudi Arabia, in an article recently published in Harper's magazine. Briefly, the plan includes a first wave Marine division, with one or two
battalions amphibious-landed and the rest unloaded from aboard ship, and an
'airlift wave of the 82nd Airborne Division, whose C-5 and C-141 jet transports
would be briefly staged and refueled in Israel, flown across Saudi Arabia to
Dhahran and escorted by air-refueled Phantom fighters, which would also be
based on Israeli fields or aboard carriers in the Arabian sea. One or two
paratroop batallions would jump to seize the Dhahran airfield, and once the
airfield was secured, the rest of the troops would land. Soon after the Marines
landed, a second Army division would arrive, the First Cavalry, by air, and
staged by way of Israel, except for the tanks, which would be unloaded from
177Id.
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Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, when asked if the United
States was contemplating military action, responded, "We should
have learned from Vietnam that it is easier to get into a war
than to get out of it. I am not saying that there's no circumstance
where we would not use force. But it is one thing to use it in the
case of a dispute over price; it's another where there is some actual strangulation of the industrialized world."178
Professional analysts see two contingencies as having the potential to bring about a U.S. military seizure of Arab oil fields:
1. A failure to achieve a solution to the devastating economic consequence of the enormous increase in oil prices during the past year; or
2. A new Arab embargo on petroleum exports, which could
push the West's sluggish economies into a depression accompanied by widespread hardship,
(a) as a result of another Mideast war between Arab and
Israeli forces; or
(b) as an attempt to induce Israeli territorial conces179
sions.
Nevertheless, military intervention is viewed as a last resort18° to be employed only if economic and diplomatic measures
fail to bring down the price of oil or end a new Arab embargo.
One of the primary considerations for elected officials in a
democracy is domestic public opinion. Only 10 percent of Amercans surveyed in a recent Gallup Poll believed that the United
States should resort to military intervention should the Arabs impose another oil boycott.181 The moral conscience of the American people in recent decades has been marked by opposition to
the acquisition of territory by force. Territory under American
control has been surrendered on several occasions in favor of the
principle of self-determination (for example, Cuba, the Phillipines,
fast land ships and fast freighters. Finally, the expedition would be reinforced
with the combat echelons of a second Marine division.
"Except for staging
and refueling points in Israel - itself almost 1,000 miles away (Hatserim to
Dhahran) - there would be no friendly bases within easy reach. The Israelis
owe a great deal to the United States, and it is inconceivable that they would
deny airfield facilities, even if the operation entailed serious risks for them."
Ignotus, Seizing Arab Oil, HARPER'S, Feb. 1975, at 44.
178Kissinger on Oil, Food, and Trade, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 13, 1975, at 69.
179Quoted in Will U.S. Seize Mideast Oil? U. S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Dec. 2, 1974, at 18.
110Secretary of State Kissinger has mentioned the use of force as a last step
in the event of a "grave emergency" over petroleum. See N.Y. Times, Jan.
3, 1975, at 2, col. 1.
181Supra note 162.
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West Germany, Austria, Italy and Japan). American war weariness, a by-product of U.S. involvement in Indo-China, might
also account for the high percentage of Americans opposing military intervention. "If Vietnam was full of trees and brave men,
and the national interest was almost invisible, here there are no
trees, very few men, and a clear objective. There could be serious risks in the operation, but at least there would be no sense of
futility with 200 billion barrels of oil underfoot - oil that would restore jobs to the unemployed and supply the wherewithal for a
Starving, unemployed
gradual program of substitution."182
necessary to reverse
measures
Americans might support whatever
Nevertheless, a mood of isolationism
economic "strangulation."
appears to be sweeping the United States. Congress has placed
severe restraints upon the ability of the Executive to commit
83
In
American troops abroad in a foreign military conflict.
the wake of the disaster of Vietnam, Americans no longer feel
determined to restrain the spread of communism. Congressional
action with respect to Angola *indicates that not only will this
nation refuse to send its young men to fight in a foreign war,
but it will also refuse to lend even relatively miniscule financial
support to those who themselves desire the means with which to
Congress
resist Soviet-Cuban interventionist neo-colonialism.
has permitted the relative military strength of the United States
to deteriorate;184 and President Carter called for the withdrawal
123, at 51.
to the Vietnam War, United States Presidents had sent troops
abroad into armed conflict on 125 occasions, all of which occured without
Congressional approval. Lynch, An Inquiry into the Law of War and Warfare,
7 TEX. INT'L L. J. 481, 493 (1972). See Note, Presidential Power to Make War, 7
INDIANA L. REV. 900 (1974); Note, 1973 War Powers Legislation: Congress ReAsserts Its Warmaking Power, 5 LOYOLA U. L. J. 83 (1974). See also L. HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 50-65 and 102-104 (1972).
184The 4-to-I advantage the United States held a decade ago in strategic
missiles and bombers has disappeared. Today, the USSR has 2,537 long-range
bombers and missiles, compared to 2,142 for the United States.
Since 1970, the United States has reduced the size of its armed forces by
900,000, while the Soviet Union has expanded its by 270,000. Today, the Soviet
Union has 3,575,000 troops compared to 2,130,000 for the United States. Soviet
spending represents 15 percent of their gross national product, compared to only
5 percent for the United States. Back to the Cold War? U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Jan. 26, 1976, at 25. See Schlesinger Sees U.S. Heading for Disaster, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 22, 1975, at 22; Fewer American Servicemen on Guard
Around the World, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 29, 1975, at 20; Putting
Military Spending in Perspective, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 22, 1975, at 21;
Where Russia Is Outstripping U.S. in Military Might, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Feb. 9, 1976, at 20. See As U.S.-Russia Showdown Nears Over Angola, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 19, 1976, at 22; Moscow's Risky Bid for Influence, TIME,
182Supra note
183Prior
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of American troops from South Korea during his campaign. 185
The United States is quite a different nation than it was prior to
its defeat in Indo-China.
Initial world public opinion would, to say the least, indicate
vehement opposition to a U.S. military seizure of Arab oil fields.
The Soviet Union might use it as an excuse to seize West Berlin,
or Finland, or beyond. However, industrialists and labor in Japan and Europe would be delighted that their factories are running again. The Fourth World, whose economic progress has
been crippled by the incredibly inflated price of petroleum, and
whose millions will starve because of the diminished production
of fertilizers, might eventually be delighted to receive oil at pre1973 prices or lower.
Finally, from a purely military standpoint, some strategic
planners indicate that an operation to seize Arab oil fields poses
no insurmountable obstacles for United States armed forces, particularly since the United States has established a naval presence in the Indian Ocean with the construction of naval facilities
on the British island of Diego Garcia. An assessment recently
published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute arrives at this conclusion: "Obviously, a powerful country
such as the United States would have little difficulty in conquering most the countries in the Middle East. Successful military
control over the Arabian-Persian Gulf area could probably be
achieved in hours, or even minutes. The problem would be in
sustaining such an. operation and managing its repercussions."
Three nations are pinpointed by military experts as potential
targets for an armed action: Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
However, some authorities maintain that the current oil production of Libya and Kuwait is inadequate to cope with an international economic crisis of the scope that could trigger military
action. Daily output in Kuwait is approximately 2 million barrels and in Libya 1.4 million. That would be sufficient to meet
U.S. import demands, but would not supply the minimum import requirements of Western Europe. Saudi Arabia, with daily
output of over 8 million barrels, is the only nation that could
produce enough petroleum to meet the essential needs of both
Europe and America. Military planners indicate 'that three diviJan. 9, 1976, at 46; The Battle Over Angola, TIME, Dec. 29, 1975, at 7; A Tiger

At the Back Door, TIME, Feb. 9, 1976, at 34; Ottaway, How U.S. Ally in Angola
Became a Spectacular Failure, Wash. Post, Feb. 19, 1976, at A-12, col. 1.
I'Sjimmy Carter: Not Just Peanuts, TIME, Mar. 8, 1976, at 20.
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sions would be sufficient to seize the oil fields in any of these
three countries. 186
Setting aside all moral considerations, such a course of action
would undoubtedly carry with it a cataclysmic risk. Military action might well induce a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation and
thereby ignite a third World War. The Soviet Union could deploy a naval flotilla off the Saudi Arabian coast, or move minesweepers into the Straits of Hermuz, or land troops in Iraq. However, at least one high-level U.S. policy maker has discounted
the risk of Soviet intervention, arguing that the Soviets would
recognize that the American military intervention in Arab oil
States involved vital U.S. interests and only marginal Russian
interests. Therefore, he argues the Soviets would stand aside just as we did in Czechoslovakia where we recognized that Soviet
national interests were at stake.
Nevertheless, it may well be true that, in a nuclear age, the
survival of man depends upon adherence to existing principles of
international law.
2.

Legal Limitations on the Use of Force

During the 18th and 19th centuries, and the first two decades
of the 20th, a State could resort to war for any reason it deemed
proper, and international law was not thereby violated18 7 However, in 1928, recourse to war for the solution of international disputes was condemned in the Kellog-Briand Pact, and war was
renounced as an instrument of national policy 88 Since then,
condemnation of the settlement of controversies between States
by other than pacific means has been reaffirmed by the community of nations on a number of occasions 8 9
Clearly, the weight of current international law, as expressed
in numerous U.N. resolutions, prohibits the occupation and ac-

186

Will U.S. Seize Mideast Oil?, U.S.

NEWS

& WORLD REP., Dec. 2, 1974,

at 19. See generally M. WILLRICH, ENERGY AND WORLD POLITICS 94-102 (1975).
187During the time of Grotius, a distinction was drawn between "just" and
"unjust" wars. W. BISHOP, JR., INTERNATIONAL LAW 913 (1962).
18 Kellog-Briand "Pacts of Paris," Aug. 27, 1928, art. 1, 46 Stat. 2343,

4 Malloy (Trenwith) Treaties 5130, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
189See League of Nations Covenant, articles 12, 13, 15 and 16; see also
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of
the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
The Nurnberg Charter was unanimously affirmed by the U.N. General Assembly. G.A. Res. 95, U.N. Doc. A/236 at 1144 (1946).
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quisition of the territory of another State by force,19° war1 91 or
military conquest.92
Moreover, existing principles of international law prohibit the use of force in the relations between States.
Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations solemnly declares:
All members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any State, or in any other matter
inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations.
This principle
paragraph 1 of
number of other
also be violated

of international law was recently reaffirmed in
the Declaration on Friendly Relations.193
A
principles contained in the Declaration would
by a U.S. military seizure of Arab oil fields.

For example, paragraph 4 prohibits the ".

.

. use of force to vio-

late the existing international boundaries of another State." Paragraph 6 proclaims the duty "to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force."194

Also, the military occupation and

acquisition by force of the territory of another State is prohibited
by paragraph 10.19
However, paragraph 13 clearly indicates
that the right of lawful self-defense as contained in the U.N.
Charter is in no way inhibited by the Declaration on Friendly
190See G.A. Res. 2628, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 5, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1970); G.A. Res. 2799, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 29) 82, U.N. Doc.
A/8429 (1971); G.A. Res. 2949, 27 U.N. GAOR Part I, at 24, U.N. Doc.
A/4548 (1972).
191See 22 U.N. SCOR, Res. 242, at 8 (1967).
192 See 23 U.N. SCOR,
Res. 252, at 8-12 (1968); 24 U.N. SCOR, Res.
267, at 4 (1969); 24 U.N. SCOR, Res. 271, at 5 (1969); 26 U.N. SCOR, Res.
298, at 6 (1971).
193 Declarations on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1970), 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 243 (1971). Former Secretary of State
Dean Rusk has suggested that the wording of the Declaration on Friendly
Relations supports the view of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter as jus cogens.
Rusk, The 25th UN General Assembly and the Use of Force, 2 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 19, 21 (Supp. 1) (1972). The fact that the Declaration on Friendly
Relations, as an interpretation of the U. N. Charter, was adopted by the General
Assembly by acclamation without dissent (although without formal vote) may
also lend support to the view of the Declaration as jus cogens.
194 Thus, retaliation against injuries which do not permit the exercise of
the right of self-defense is prohibited. Reprisals were also condemned by a
Resolution of the Security Council of April 9, 1964, as incompatible with the
purposes of the United Nations. Rusk, supra note 193, at 26.
195 The forcible military occupation of the territory of another State is also
violative of the Declaration on Strengthening of International Security. G.A.
Res. 2734, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 22-24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
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Therefore, unless the United States could lawfully
Relations.
assert the right of self-defense, U.S. military intervention against
Arab oil producers would clearly be prohibited by the above
principles of international law.
3.

National Self-Defense Under Article 51

Normal difficulties in delineating legitimate responses to coercion have been compounded by the regime of nonviolence contemplated by the framers of the United Nations Charter. Under the
Charter, the primary responsibility for peace-keeping has been
vested in the Security Council, with limited utilization of defensive
force reserved for the State which suffers an assault.""Under the U.N. Charter, recourse to force is permitted in
only two instances: (a) Within the framework of the collective
security system created by the United Nations, and (b) in selfdefense in response to an armed attack, in accordance with Article
51 of the Charter, which provides that: "Nothing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual and collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member . . ."
Admittedly there is a strong school of thought adhering to the
view that Article 51 explicitly condones only one type of legitimate
197
withself-defense (that is, the repulsion of an armed attack)
out negating other types preexisting under customary international law (that is, resistance to aggression in its several manifestations). 198
The phrase "if an armed attack occurs" is open to two interpretations. It may be argued that the proviso is a restraint on the
traditional right of self-defense so that the right is presently available to only those U.N. members who are the objects of an actual
armed attack. 199 Professor Kunz, for example, argues that the
A. TUSSING, TOWARD A RATIONAL POLICY FOR OIL AND GAS IMPORTS
391 (1974).
phrase is, of course, "if an armed attack occurs."
197 The controversial
One need only recall the agony imposed upon those who attempted to defend
President Kennedy's interdiction of the shipment of missiles to Cuba to grasp
See Mallison, Jr., Limited Naval
some sense of the complexities involved.
Blockade or Quarantine-Interdiction: National and Collective Defense Claims Valid
Under International Law, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 335 (1965); Oliver, International
Law and the Quarantine of Cuba, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 373 (1963); Campbell, The
Cuban Crisis and the U.N. Charter: An Analysis of the United States Position, 16
STAN. L. REV. 160 (1963).
198See Dinstein, supra note 168, at 468; D. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 187-192 (1958); M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 232-241 (1961).
199See D. Bowett id., at 187.
196
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right of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter does not
exist against any form of aggression which does not constitute an
"armed attack":
As in municipal law, self-defense under Article 51 is not a
procedure to enforce the law, is not designed to punish the aggressor or to obtain indemnities, is not an enforcement action
by the United Nations, but serves primarily to repel an illegal
armed attack. But, contrary to municipal law, it may not stop
here: it seems to give the State or States exercising the right
of individual or collective self-defense the right to resort to a
justified war, to carry this war to victory, to impose a peace
treaty upon the vanquished aggressor, always presupposing that
the Security Council has failed and continues to fail of taking
the measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. The right of self-defense is, in such cases, a right to
resort to war. . . It seems also that the conditions of necessity, reasonableness, and a certain proportionality, which the
municipal law prescribes for the exercise of the right of selfdefense, are lacking in Article 51.
Self-defense in municipal law presupposes an illegal attack; this is certainly true also in international law.
"Armed attack" as the only condition of the right of selfdefense under Article 51 may, in conceivable circumstances,
mean to [sic] little. For this right does not exist against any
form of aggression which does not constitute "armed attack."
. . . The threat of aggression does not justify self-defense under
Article 51."
Professor Kelsen also argues that Article 51 restricts the right
of self-defense to the case of an "armed attack" actually made by
one State against another. He asserts, "Self-defense . . . is selfhelp against the illegal use of force, not against other violations
of the law. " 201 These authorities contend that the combined effect of Article 2(4) and Article 51 is to restrict the right of selfdefense to cases falling precisely within the wording of Article
51 - making that Article the exclusive source of authority of
legitimate recourse to war, so that any "threat or use of force"
not within its terms is a violation of Article 2(4). 202 Under
this interpretation, the combination of Article 2(4) and 51 would
render all use of force illegal except in the exercise of self-defense
"if an armed attack occurs." 20 3 Thus, Article 51 would be
2
Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 872, 876-877 (1947).
21 Kelsen, Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense Under the Charter of
the United Nations, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 783, 784 (1948).

2o2See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF
2 See supra note 40, at 265.

NATIONS

417 (1963).
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construed as a restriction on the traditional right of self-defense,
so that the right could not be exercised in the case of a violation
of a Member's legally protected interests except with those Members who are the object of an actual armed attack.20
Indeed, some scholars assert that Article 51 demands an
even higher degree of necessity than does customary international law for the characterization of coercion as permissible selfdefense, in that it limits justifying necessity to an "armed attack"
as distinguished from applications of nonmilitary types of intense
One scholar, Dr. Niici6, specifically asserts that
coercion.
economic aggression does not warrant armed action on the basis
of Article 51. 205 Certainly, because the employment of the Arab
oil weapon in an embargo of petroleum, and the resultant "strangulation" of Western economies would not constitute an "armed
attack", Article 51 would be inapplicable. Moreover, a resort to
force against various forms of indirect aggression (including
economic aggression) could not be derived from Article 51 if the
However, a narrequirement of proportionality is observed.2
row reading of Article 51 would seem to constitute an underestimation of the potentialities of contemporary techniques of
nonmilitary coercion. 2°7
2°8
However, this interpretation complies neither with the letter
nor the spirit of the Charter, and consequently has been rejected
by most authorities. 2° 9 The weight of authority appears to interpret Article 51 as precluding preventive countermeasures which
2 0
law. 1
may have been legitimate under customary international
These scholars assert that the source of the right of self-defense
is not the U.N. Charter, but is an independent and inherent
right rooted in general international law; and the purpose of
Article 51 was to remove all possible doubts as to its survival after
211
They argue that U.N. members
promulgation of the Charter.
continue to possess those sovereign and inherent rights which
2 Supra note 30, at 187.
2D Supra note 31, at 233.
20 Supra note 40, at 279.
27 Supra note 31, at 238.
28 Although the English and Spanish texts use "armed attack" and ataque
armado respectively, the equally authentic French text utilizes the clearer term
agression militaire.
29 See Kunz, supra note 100, at 887-888; Dinstein, supra note 168, at 468;
H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 797-798 (1950).
210See A. TUSSING, supra note 196, at 391.
211J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 417 (1963).

ECONOMIC AGGRESSION

1977]

general international law accords to them, except and insofar as
they have been assumed under the Charter.213 Thus, each member retains the inherent right of self-defense subject only to such
limitations as are contained in the Charter.214 Because it is well
recognized under traditional international law that an armed attack is not the only form of aggression which so imperils a State's
rights so that it may be compelled to resort to the exercise of a
right of self-defense,2 15 a military response to intense economic
coercion may well be permissible under customary international
law.

The U.N. Charter expressly permits the use of force in only
two instances: (1) Individual or collective self-defense, and (2)
implementation of a decision by a competent international organization.2 16 The Charter was originally interpreted as a somewhat absolutist document, prescribing the elimination of aggressive
force.217 Those scholars who assert that the U.N. Charter prohibits all forms of self-defense other than Article 51 self-defense
would be entirely justified to prohibit the use of force if the
United Nations or collective security organs had either established the collective machinery to oppose aggression; or could and
would respond quickly on an ad hoc basis. But, for the most part,
this machinery does not exist. War between nations did not end
when the U.N. Charter was signed in San Francisco. Despite
the hopes of its founders, the United Nations, as an organ of
collective international security, has been impotent (with the exception of certain fortuitous circumstances surrounding U.N.
military involvement in Korea). Moreover, to reject the right of
self-defense in contexts not involving overt violence, under certain circumstances, may require the target State to assume a
218
suicidal posture.
The "legislative history" of the U.N. Charter appears to favor the
position held by the latter group of scholars. The travaux preparatoires, to which one may legitimately resort in the case of ambiguity, suggests only that Article 51 should safeguard the existing
212Supra note 30, at 185.
213 Supra note
214 Supra note
215 Id.

40, at 272.
30, at 193.

at 192.

216 Lillich, Forcible Self-Help Under International Law, 22 NAVAL WAR COL. REV.

56 (1970).
217 Id. at 57.
218 Supra note 31, at 202-03.
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right of self-defense and not restrict it.219 The preparatory work
on the Charter clearly indicates that Article 51 was not drafted
for the purpose of deliberately narrowing the permissibility of

self-defense under customary international law against an unlawful attack where the required degree of necessity exists.
Moreover, in the process of formulating the prohibition of unilateral coercion contained in Article 2(4), the drafters indicated
that the traditional permissibility of self-defense was not intended
to be abridged or attenuated but, to the contrary, preserved and
Further, under principles of traditional intermaintained.m
national law, restrictions on the inherent rights of a sovereign
State are not lightly to be presumed. 221

Therefore, assuming that the U.N. Charter does not limit
the preexisting inherent right of self-defense held by sovereign

nations, it is appropriate now to examine the permissibility of a
military response to intense economic coercion under principles
of customary international law.
The Customary InternationalLaw of Self-Defense

4.

As a principle of international law, the right
This
has never been seriously- disputed.2
deemed so fundamental that a reservation of the
mate defense was made a condition precedent to
the

Kellog-Briand

Pact. 223

Moreover,

of self-defense
privilege was
right of legitithe signing of

it is clear

that under

customary international law the right of self-defense was not
limited to cases of an actual armed attack.224
The prerequisites of customary international law for the lawful
assertion of a claim of self-defense are most commonly summarized by the terms "necessity" and "proportionality."225
Often these restrictions have been cast in such rigid phraseology
so as to make the privilege unassertable. The traditional formulation of the principle is found in the oft-quoted words of Secretary of State Webster in the Caroline case of 1842. There he
said, "While it is admitted that exceptions growing out of the
219Supra note 30, at 188.
2

Supra note 31, at 235.
30, at 188.

221 Supra note

222Weightman,

Self-Defense in International Law, 37 VA. L.

(1951).
40, at 235; see supra hote 53, at 1108.
199, at 188.
225Supra note 31, at 217.

223Supra note
224Supra note

REV.

1095,

1114
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great law of self-defense do exist, those exceptions should be confined to cases in which the necessity of that self-defense is
instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation." 221 A more widely accepted defimition of the principle of proportionality was articulated by de
Brouck~re in 1927, who said, "Legitimate defense implies the
adoption of measures proportionate to the seriousness of the attack and justified by the imminence of the danger. "227
Under both formulations, it would appear that a resort to
military force might be disproportionate to harm suffered from
economic aggression, and might therefore be illegal. Directly
after World War II, the question of the legality of the use of force
in self-defense in response to economic injury was placed before
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. The Tribunal
rejected the contention that Japanese military operations against
The Netherlands, Great Britain, France, and the United States
were justifiable, as within the privilege of self-defense because
those nations took economic measures against Japan, and that
as a result, she was forced to go to war to preserve the welfare and
prosperity of her nationals.228
Thus, the requirement of proportionality will generally prohibit the lawful use of force in response to economic aggression.
This need not be so inevitably; one may recall the statement
made by the United Kingdom with respect to Article 4 of the
Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States to the effect that exceptions to the duty of nonintervention may exist
where a State is "pursuing a course which leads to the economic
However, situations in which
strangulation of another State."
self-defense would justify the employment of forceful means
against a wrongful action not involving the use of force would
certainly be rare, and the defending State would be put to the
most stringent standard of proof as to the necessity of the case,
the lack of alternative means of protection, and the proportionate
229
nature of the reaction.
Nevertheless, the interest which a State may have in the
preservation of its national economy and its essential economic
interests may be equally as compelling as its interest in safe2

2

MOORE,

INTERNATIONAL

Caroline and MacLeod Cases, 32 AM. J.
227Supra note 31, at 261.
m Supra note 40, at 253.
221
Supra note 30, at 110.

LAW 409-414 (1906).
INT'L L. 82 (1938).

See Jennings,

The
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guarding its territory, its political independence, or its people.23
Thus, if as a result of a prolonged embargo of petroleum by Arab
nations, most of the world's factories grind to a halt without fuel,
and mass unemployment and starvation results, such devastation
would be at least as economically catastrophic as if industrial
complexes had been bombed.
Customary international law has always required a high
degree of necessity to support the lawfulness of a response of
force. One index of the required condition of necessity is the
degree of opportunity of effective recourse to nonviolent modes of
adjustment and response. Certainly, a prerequisite to the use of
force against Arab oil producers would be the exhaustion of nonviolent alternatives. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger emphasized, " . . . the use of force would be considered only in the
' '231
greatest emergency.
As has been indicated, the legal obstacles to a U.S. military
seizure of Arab oil fields are numerous, complex and possibly
fatal. One must first determine whether the fact that economic
coercion has not been generally accepted as within the definition
of aggression is of significance in giving rise to the right of selfdefense. Secondly, one must ponder the issue of whether the
prohibitions against the use of force in response to economic
aggression implied in Articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter
prohibit the use of force against intense economic coercion under
customary international law. Once these two obstacles have
been surmounted, one must determine whether the use of force
under circumstances in which the U.S. economy is faced with
'strangulation" would be permissible under existing principles of
international law.
The use of force in self-defense is permissible for the purpose
of protecting the security of a State and its essential rights - in
particular the rights of territorial integrity and political independence - upon which that security depends. Customary international law imposes the three following conditions upon the lawful
assertion of the use of force in self-defense:
1. The target State must be guilty of a prior international
delinquency against the claimant State.
2. An attempt by the claimant State to obtain redress or
protection by other means must be known to have been made,
and failed, or to be inappropriate or impossible in the circumstances.
230id. at 106.
231

Supra note 178.
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3. The claimant's use of force must be limited to the necessities of the case and proportionate to the wrong done by the
target State. 32
The case for the necessity of the use of force would be more
convincing if asserted by Japan or Western Europe, whose industrialized economies are overwhelmingly dependent upon
imported petroleum, than if made by the United States, which
imports only between 30 and 40 percent of its oil consumption.
However, within the next decade, U.S. dependency upon imported
crude will increase significantly, as will its satisfaction of the
legal requirement of necessity.
It is extremely doubtful, however, that a military response to
economic coercion would be deemed proportionate to the harm
done and therefore acceptable under existing principles of international law. But before 1973, the world had never been faced
with a situation in which a handful of nations could thrust the
world into a depression by withholding a single commodity.
One final issue which should be mentioned is the legality of
the acquisition of territory in self-defense.
Force employed in
self-defense, although lawful, must be proportionate to the threat
of immediate danger; where the threat has been averted the plea
of self-defense is no longer available. Thus, a State cannot thereby acquire title to the resources and territory of the attacker by
conquest in lawful self-defense.233
Realistically, one must face the possibility that if the United
States finds itself between a rock and a hard place, it may not be
deterred by the impermissibility of military intervention under existing principles of international law. As Senator Scott (R-Pa.)
said recently, "If in this country automobiles ground to a halt
and people couldn't get to work, if the temperature in people's
homes dropped to 50 degrees, if the wheels of industry ground to
a halt, and we couldn't employ people, I can't imagine this country not doing whatever it needed to do, either economic or military
[sic] to permit itself to survive, and we wouldn't be worth a damn
as a nation if we didn't." 234 Commenting on the Cuban missile
crisis, former Secretary of State Acheson said, "The power, position and prestige of the United States had been challenged by an232 Supra
233
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other State; and law simply does not deal with such questions of
ultimate power. . . . I cannot believe that there are principles of
law that say we must accept destruction of our way of life ...
The survival of States is not a matter of law."235
V.

THE LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS

The international energy arena appears to be dominated by
five factors: (a) The cartel of oil exporting countries, (b) the
political volatility of Southwest Asia, (c) the precarious nature
of the world monetary system, (d) the ominous repercussions of
the energy crisis upon poor countries, and (e) the global nature of
2
certain environmental problems. 36
A.

Emerging Petropolitics

It has been suggested that ecopolitics is replacing geopolitics
as the prime mover in the affairs of nations. With the industrial
nations of the world actively competing for the same petroleum
resources, and with the exporting nations employing oil to amass
unprecedented wealth and political power, petropolitics is begin37
ning to dominate both ecopolitics and geopolitics.2

American recognition of the essentiality of energy resources is
long overdue.
There is no more certain way of destroying any economy

- except the most primitive - than by depriving it of energy.
Industrial society depends entirely on a steady, secure supply of
ample energy for its maintenance and growth. Aspirations for
higher standards of living, achievement of social goals, and economic as well as military security - all depend on the availabil238
ity of needed energy reserves.

The American energy appetite is the world's most profligate.
Consumption of energy in the United States doubled between 1950
and 1960, and will double again by 1985. With only 6 percent of
the world's population, the United States consumes approximate235
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ly one-third of the world's energy and over one-half of all the
gasoline produced.
The most outstanding feature of the U.S. energy consumption
pattern is the nation's reliance on oil. Approximately 45 percent
of the energy consumed in the United States comes from oil, and
32 percent from natural gas, largely a byproduct of oil production.
Of the remainder, 18 percent comes from coal, 4 percent from
hydroelectric power, and only .5 percent from nuclear plants.239
During the winter of 1973-74, petroleum became scarce in the
United States because domestic production has declined since
1970, and the international market, already dominated by the influence of the OPEC cartel, became devastated by the Arab cutoffs resulting from the Mideast war. m
Nevertheless, the effects of the embargo were constrained by (a) the availability of
domestic reserves, (b) the importation of oil from non-OAPEC
sources, and (c) the inability of Arab nations effectively to control the destination of ocean vessels laden with petroleum. With
the nationalization and acquisition of wellhead producing and refining facilities heretofore held by the controlling oil corporations
(which, predominantly, were domiciled in the United States), the
ability of the involved States to effectively impose a destination
embargo upon oil has been significantly augmented.
Moreover, with the realization of the enormous economic and political
potential of petroleum manipulation, the Arab States are becoming more acutely aware of the alternative economic weaponry at
their disposal, and, perhaps, more sophisticated in its utilization. For example, one source has compiled a list of intriguing
types of economic coercive measures which could readily be employed by oil-exporting nations to achieve their desired ends.
The negative weapons include:
1. Withholding part or all of the oil supply from all or selected customers through (a) nationalization or threat of takeover of oil and/or other foreign investments, and (b) temporary embargoes on exports;
2. Using its "embargo"

power to demand and receive

increasingly higher prices for crude oil

-

naturally to the ex-

tent that consumer resistance, the development of substitutes,
and retaliatory measures by the oil-importing countries (e.g.,
239A. Riaicop, supra note
IMPORTS 1971-1985 (1973).

237, at 3; see H.P.
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240B. COOPER, AN ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS OF THE ENERGY EMERGENCY 1
(1973); see O'Toole, Saudis to Pay $1.5 Billion for Rest of Aramco, Wash. Post,
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import quotas, foreign investment restrictions, denial of aid,
and other retaliation) may permit;
3. Regulating domestic operation by foreign oil companies through such requirements as greater local participation in production and/or distribution; further changes in internal "value-added" taxes on oil production and marketing;
and increased local purchases, restricted company imports,
etc.;
4. Switching huge export earnings from some foreign currencies and countries to others depending on type of cooperation and attitude, or denying foreign investment in "hostile"
countries;
5. Making discriminatory price concessions, or engaging
in unfavorable price discrimination vis-a-vis selected customers,
or dumping other export products in "unfriendly" countries;
6. Retaliating against industrialized creditors by the repudiation or rescheduling of foreign debts; and
7. Shifting alliances and coalitions in trade, investment
and military agreements between cooperative and non-cooperative nations (including threats of withdrawing from membership of regional pacts or closing military bases),AI
On the other hand, the means of affirmative reinforcement
available to oil-producing States include:
1. Giving special concessions to foreign private investors
for the purposes of exploiting domestic national resources which
are outside the scope of existing contracts;
2. Promising cooperation in the reform of international
monetary, fiscal and trade systems; and
3. Investing in joint ventures for the development of energy
sources and/or other investment projects with cooperative
24
and accommodating partners. 2
What is the ability of the oil-producing nations to maintain
their enormous economic and political influence in the world community?
The question may be unanswerable, because the world has had
no experience either with high oil prices or with a cartel of fmancially solvent governments who control a nonagricultural, nonrenewable commodity for which there is no short-run substitute.
The most immediate foreign policy problem vis-a-vis oil importation which the United States will face during the next decade
will consist of attempting to reduce its vulnerability to politically
motivated oil cutoffs, particularly should the fundamental ArabIsraeli conflict remain unresolved.
By 1985, U.S. importation
241 Amuzegar, supra note 8, at 227-228.
242
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from Arab nations may well increase to 6 million barrels of oil per
day.
Nations which are dependent upon world markets for agricultural products and industrial raw materials are vulnerable to various forms of coercive economic activity, including embargoes.
Curiously, Fourth World agrarian States, although more susceptible to military coercion, may be substantially less vulnerable to
economic coercion than are industrialized States. Nevertheless,
the Fourth World may find it increasingly difficult to absorb
substantially higher costs of imported commodities which have
heretofore and will henceforth arise owing to artificial economic
manipulative measures taken by the world's cartels in an effort to
increase the wealth of their members.
B.

The Massive Shift of Wealth to Arab Nations

The world oil market, an artery of American, Western European and Japanese prosperity, has undergone an extraordinary
metamorphis in only 4 years. During that period, the oil-exporting nations (representing only a fraction of the world's
population, income and military might) acquired an almost unlimited control of world oil prices. During the first 4 years of 1970,
the price of oil rose approximately 515 percent.
The world has experienced more than a mere temporary aberration in supply and demand; it has witnessed instead a fundamental shift in the power relationships between the world's industrialized nations (for example, the United States) and the primary
petroleum exporting nations (for example, Saudi Arabia, Iran and
Kuwait). Its implications will have far-reaching effects upon
American diplomacy. I
The two massive increases in the cost of oil during 1973 were
the culmination of a dramatic shift of bargaining power from the
oil-consuming to the oil-producing nations. In the West, this
revolution was viewed, quite naturally, as a disaster; and in the
OPEC States it was perceived to be a triumphant conclusion
of a 20-year struggle for a fair return on a diminishing natural
resource.243
With the per barrel price of oil escalating from $2.10 in late
1973, to a cost which presently exceeds $10.00, petroleum producing nations have accumulated enormous cash reserves. The cost
of imported oil to the United States alone increased from $7.7
243 M. FIELD,
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CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
billion in 1973 to $24.0 billion in 1974.2 4

[Vol. 9: 205

Robert S. McNamara,

President of the World Bank, has estimated that OPEC nations
have already accumulated a surplus of $60 billion in investment

capital, and may eventually hold as much as $750 billion.245
Prior to the recent oil price increases, former Commerce Secretary Peter Peterson estimated that Arab oil producers could hold
dollar surpluses of $300 billion by 1980 - a sum equal to 20 times
the value of General Motors. If such transfers of wealth continue, it is estimated that 70 percent of the world's monetary reserves might eventually be held by Arab oil producers. By 1985,
oil-producing nations may well have accumulated cash reserves
of $1.2 trillion. The Economist of London has calculated that
members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
are acquiring capital at the rate of $115,000 a second - fast enough
to purchase the Bank of America. in 6 days, IBM in 143 days,
and all of the companies listed on the world's major stock exchanges in 15.5 years.24
The Economist described the financial
crisis in the gravest terms, stating: "A landslide of historic proportions is rumbling downhill toward most of the oil-consuming
industrialized world, in the shape of the immense balance-ofpayments surplus acquired by the producers of oil - a landslide
capable of breaking the financial system and the economies of
several major countries." 24 In an industrialized world dependent upon petroleum for economic stability, the Arab oil embargo
and OPEC's sharp increase in oil prices has created a financial
crisis of unparalleled gravity. The threat posed to industrialized
nations was described in these words by Arthur Burns, Chairman
of the Federal Reserve Board: "No economic event in a long
generation, excluding only wartime upheavals, has so seriously
disrupted our economy as the manipulation of oil prices and sup244 Pay
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27, 1975, at 25. Moreover, the current price of approximately $11.50 per barrel
is expected to rise despite the inflationary and balance-of-payments crises created,
see Why the Price of Mideast Oil Is Likely to Go Up Again, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Jan. 12, 1976, at 51. More recent increases in the price of oilhave been
far more moderate.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates agreed to
increase petroleum prices by only 5 percent, despite the decision of the remaining
11 OPEC nations to increase prices by 15 percent. See The Saudis Break Ranks,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 27, 1976, at 27.
24s Washington Whispers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 23, 1974, at 5.
See Dempsey, Legal and Economic Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment
in the Southeastern United States, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 247 (1976).
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plies over the past year . . . A great cloud of uncertainty now
'
surrounds the economic future of nations around the world."248
Secretary of State Kissinger expressed the concern of this nation
by emphasizing that we are "confronted with an unprecedented
challenge to our prosperity and to the entire structure of international cooperation.
. . . The impact of the energy crisis raises fundamental questions about the future of developing countries, the prospects for
economic growth for all nations, and the hopes for global stability .

. .

Indeed, the world's poorest nations have suffered most from
the quintupling of oil prices since the fall of 1973. The aggregate balance-of-payments deficit of non-OPEC developing nations ballooned from $11.3 billion in 1973 to approximately $42
billion last year. A primary reason for this deficit is that these
nations are now paying $13 billion more per year for oil than they
paid in 1973. Developing nations may well require approximately
$20 billion annually in capital assistance throughout the rest of
the 1970's.2
C.

Cartelization in the Third World

Cartels have never been known for their longevity. Historically, either the participants unilaterally made lower price agreements with purchasers in order to secure a larger share of the market, or new suppliers, attracted by high prices, entered the market
and undercut the cartel's power of monopolization.
The durability of the OPEC cartel should not however, be
underestimated. No new significant suppliers of oil are visible
on the horizon. Meanwhile, Western Europe continues to be de248Is
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2s0 OPEC oil ministers, meeting in Paris, recently agreed to establish an
$800 million fund for 1 year to make long-term, interest-free loans to lessdeveloped nations - OPEC's first gesture as a group to assist poor nations
which are afflicted with enormous oil bills. Oil-exporting nations have refused
to provide their poorest customers with a price reduction, preferring to assist
through direct grants and loans and investment in agencies such as the World
Bank. Yet, almost two-thirds of direct OPEC assistance during 1974 and 1975
was given to Egypt and Syria. Indeed, less than 10 percent of OPEC direct
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by the United Nations as "most seriously affected" by high oil prices have
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1976, at 76.

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 9: 205

pendent upon the Middle East for 70 percent of its oil, and Japan
imports 40 percent of its consumption from the region. Additionally, Middle Eastern leaders are convinced that it is economically
prudent to prolong the life of their nonrenewable resources by
reducing production.251
The initiative for the formation of cartels and other priceincreasing arrangements has traditionally arisen in developing
States which feel that they have not received equitable economic
treatment in the past. It is almost universally recognized that
henceforth a plethora of efforts will be undertaken by primary
producing countries to maximize their own returns on their sales
of primary resources through whatever means are deemed adequate to achieve these ends.252 Cartels among developing States
have already developed for bananas, bauxite, coffee, copper, iron
ore, mercury, phosphates and tin; 25 3 and the United States is
today dependent upon imports for 50 percent or more of its total
requirements of bauxite, chromite, cobalt, manganese, nickel,
platinum, tin and zinc.25 4 The vulnerability of the United States
to economic coercive measures (including embargoes) undertaken
by such cartels is apparent.
Cartelization among Third World States exporting natural
resources vital to the economies of importing nations can be expected to grow. With its growth, the price increases of essential raw materials will have inflationary repercussions upon an already weakened world monetary system.
Organized blocs of
exporting States, although militarily impotent, will learn that they
can nevertheless wage a significant amount of economic coercive
warfare against importing States to achieve whatever political or
economic ends from their customers that they desire.2 s
In
particular, the effectiveness of their employment of economic
means in the acquisition of wealth by increasing artificially the
cost of their resources can be expected to grow as they become
more experienced and proficient in the manipulation of their col251 Supra note 236, at 16.

252See Note, International Commodity Agreements, 6 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 275 (1976).
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See also Ford's "Common Sense" Program for 1976,
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Cartels, 24 AM. U. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1975).
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lective economic tools. Only the self-sufficient States, or those
States themselves exporting a substantial volume of raw materials
or manufactured goods, can avoid the incremental effects of a
balance-of-payments deficit. The cost increases will not be limited in their effect to the industrialized States. Indeed, importing
nations of the Fourth World may well suffer relatively more intense degrees of economic deprivation than industrialized nations,
which appear more capable of successfully withstanding the
shock of increased prices.

